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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The practice of law by law students is a significant departure from the 
general ethical prescription that only licensed members of a state bar are 
entitled to represent clients.1 Indeed, permitting students to practice law is 
relatively unusual in the world. Clinic students in most other countries 
usually perform only the tasks that law clerks and paralegals perform in 
the United States.  
 Representation by supervised students has been deemed ethical and 
appropriate, however, because its serves the needs of courts, clients, law 
schools, the bar, and perhaps the country as well. Courts welcome student 
practitioners because student representation of indigent litigants helps 
courts fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide lawyers in criminal 
cases, and because students bring some level of sophistication to practice 
in civil cases where lawyers are not required by the Constitution. Clients 
welcome student representation because students provide some guidance 
and support where there otherwise would be none. Law schools, students, 
and the bar welcome student practice because it bridges the gap between 
theory and practice and increases students’ abilities to practice early in 
their careers. In addition, it facilitates the formation of strong ethical and 
professional foundations and protects the norms and values of the 
profession by introducing them to new lawyers while they are still under 
close supervision. Finally, student representation enhances the legal 
system for everyone in the country by enabling more people to resolve 
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
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their legal disputes in a fair manner in a court of law.2 As long as the 
students and their supervisors perform their duties adequately, no ethical 
issues arise.   
 Experiential learning has become a prominent and sophisticated 
aspect of modern legal education. Clinical faculties have grown and the 
number and scope of clinical courses3 have increased because the 
pedagogy instills a deep appreciation of theory integrated with practice. 
Growth has been encouraged by the organized bar which prefers its new 
members to have clinical experience, and by students who crave the 
practical, personal, and jurisprudential education that clinical studies 
provide. As the demand for clinical education grew in the mid-to-late 
20th-century, courts and state bars responded by promulgating student 
practice rules that allowed students to represent people before local and 
federal tribunals, prescribed the requirements for students’ eligibility, and 
defined the roles and responsibilities of lawyers who would supervise 
students’ work. 
 The District of Columbia was an early proponent of student practice, 
enacting its first rules in 1968. Although those rules were modified 
periodically during the two decades of their existence, they had remained 
unchanged since the 1980s. Law schools and the practice of law, however, 
have changed dramatically since 1980. As a result, the District of 
Columbia rule, which was once a model for other states, became overly 
restrictive and too narrow to address the new nature of practice and the 
expansion of clinical courses in District of Columbia law schools. With 
that in mind, a group of law professors from the six District of Columbia 
law schools began studying student practice rules from around the country 
in order to revise and modernize the District’s rules. They were later 
joined by judges from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to further 
refine the professors’ work and craft a set of amendments. The 
amendments were implemented in the Fall of 2014. 
2. Cf. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW 
INCOME COMMUNITY 42 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]. 
3. The definition of clinical education varies depending upon who is using the term. The 
American Bar Association defines a clinic as a course that provides substantial lawyering 
experience that involves one or more actual clients and includes (i) advising or 
representing a client; (ii) direct supervision of the student’s performance by a faculty 
member; (iii) opportunities for performance, feedback from a faculty member, and self-
evaluation; and (iv) a classroom instructional component. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 304(b) (2014). That definition, which describes what is 
sometimes referred to as an “in-house clinic,” guides this article and guided the 
conversations among the drafters of the amendments to the District of Columbia student 
practice rule.  
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 This article traces the history of the amendment process. It provides a 
short history of student practice rules and then, using the student practice 
rule in effect in the District of Columbia prior to the 2014 amendments, 
describes the various components of those rules that courts and bars across 
the nation have implemented to assist courts, advance legal education, and 
preserve advocates’ ethical obligations to clients. It then describes some of 
the comments to the proposed amendments offered by the District of 
Columbia Bar and other D.C. lawyers during the public comment period 
and the modifications to the District of Columbia student practice rule that 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals accepted. Finally, it discusses 
some areas of disagreement that arose during the process and a description 
of the reasons for those disagreements.  
 
I.  A SHORT HISTORY OF STUDENT PRACTICE RULES 
 
A. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 Long before the advent of formal student practice rules, several law 
schools established legal aid dispensaries that allowed law students to 
counsel or represent poor people in need of legal assistance. The legal 
dispensaries arose during the late 1890s and early 1900s in reaction to 
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s casebook method of instruction that 
permeated legal education.4 The movement also responded to a series of 
articles written by Jerome Frank that advocated using legal dispensaries 
and actual cases to train students,5 and articles written by John Bradway 
and William Rowe, that described the benefits law school clinical 
education programs provided to students and clients.6  
 Dispensaries were developed at the University of Cincinnati College 
of Law, George Washington University Law School, Harvard Law School, 
University of Minnesota Law School, Northwestern University School of 
Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, University of Tennessee 
College of Law, and Yale Law School throughout the 1890s and 1900s.7 
4. Margaret Martin Barry, et al., Clinical Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6 (2000). 
5. See generally Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947); 
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical-Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). 
6. See generally John S. Bradway, The Beginning of the Legal Clinic of the University of 
Southern California, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1929); John S. Bradway, Legal Aid Clinic as 
a Law School Course, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 320 (1930); John S. Bradway, The Legal Aid 
Clinic as an Educational Device, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1153 (1934); John S. Bradway, 
Legal Aid Clinics in Less Thickly Populated Communities, 30 MICH. L. REV. 905 (1932); 
John S. Bradway, The Nature of a Legal Aid Clinic, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 (1930); 
John S. Bradway, The Objectives of Legal Aid Clinic Work, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 173 
(1939); William V. Rowe, Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers—A Necessity, 11 
ILL. L. REV. 591 (1917). 
7. Barry et al., supra note 4, at 6 n.10. 
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None of these schools’ states, however, had a student practice rule. The 
first student practice rule was established in Colorado in 19098 to reflect 
the work of the Denver University College of Law’s Legal Aid 
Dispensary,9 founded in 1904. The Colorado rule read,  
 
Students of any law school which has been 
continuously in existence for at least ten years 
prior to the passage of this section and which 
maintains a legal aid dispensary where poor 
persons receive legal advice and services, shall 
when representing said dispensary and its clients 
and then only be authorized to appear in court as if 
licensed to practice.10  
 
Notwithstanding this innovation, no other state court implemented a 
student practice rule until 1957, when the courts of Wyoming11 and 
Massachusetts12 promulgated such rules. Massachusetts, however, had 
been allowing students to represent indigent clients in civil cases prior to 
1957, based on a 1935 state supreme court statement that said “[t]he 
gratuitous furnishing of legal aid to the poor . . . in the pursuit of any civil 
remedy . . . do[es] not constitute the practice of law.”13 Because their 
representation was allowed based on a client’s status as indigent—not on 
their own statuses as students—the Massachusetts students who 
represented litigants before 1957 entered their appearances in court as 
“citizens” rather than as “law students.”14 
 The expansion of clinical education programs in American law 
schools, which began in the late 1960s, accelerated a nation-wide 
promulgation of state student practice rules.15 This expansion was driven 
by the social upheaval that accompanied the civil rights and anti-Vietnam 
War movements,16 a renewed dissatisfaction with the casebook method, 
and the influx of money to law schools from the Ford Foundation and later 
8. Student Practice as a Method of Legal Education and a Means of Providing Legal 
Assistance to Indigents: An Empirical Study, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 370 (1973) 
[hereafter Student Practice]. 
9. The Denver College of Law is now called University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
10. COL. STAT. ANN., ch. 9, § 254-A (1911). 
11. WYO. BAR R. 18 (1957). 
12. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:11 (1957). 
13. In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313, 317–18 (Mass. 1935), cited in Student 
Practice, supra note 8, at 370 n. 40; see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Petition to Amend Local Rule 96, at 4 (D.C. 1968).  
14. Student Practice, supra note 8, at 370 (citing Ridgberg, Student Practice Rules and 
Statutes, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 223 (E. Kitch 
ed. 1970)). 
15. See Barry et al., supra note 4, at 16–19. 
16. See id. at 12–17. 
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the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) 
to establish clinical education programs.17 The latter effort, led by CLEPR 
director William Pincus, was met with some wariness on the part of both 
courts and law schools.18 Law schools, wedded to the Langdell method of 
legal education for more than a half-century,19 were reluctant to 
reintroduce law practice into the university-based academic law 
curriculum. Local courts, fearful that faculty members would turn the 
simplest landlord-tenant case into a Supreme Court initiative, worried 
about clogged court calendars and the intrusion of the social justice 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s into every claim initiated by law 
student counsel. Nonetheless, by 1968, at least fourteen states had 
promulgated student practice rules.20  
 Development of student practice rules accelerated again after 1969, 
when the American Bar Association wrote a comprehensive model student 
practice rule.21 The ABA model rule acknowledged the court’s and the 
bar’s duties to provide legal representation to the poor and encouraged law 
schools to join that effort by creating clinical instruction in trial work.22 
The rule set forth the kinds of cases and the tribunals wherein 
representation by law students should be permitted,23 the eligibility 
requirements for student certification,24 and the eligibility requirements 
for supervising faculty and other lawyers who would guide students’ 
work.25 The validity of these rules gained further credence after Supreme 
Court Justice William Brennan noted in his concurrence in Argersinger v. 
17. See id. at 18–20; J. P. “Sandy” Ogilvy, Celebrating CLEPR's 40th Anniversary: The 
Early Development of Clinical Legal Education and Legal Ethics Instruction in U.S. Law 
Schools, 16 CLINICAL. L.  REV. 1, 9–15 (2009); Elliot Milstein, Professor of Law, 
American University Washington College of Law, Why the Clinical Section Award is 
Called the “William Pincus Award,” delivered January 2009 (on file with author).  
18. See Wallace Mlyniec, The Intersection of Three Visions—Ken Pye, Bill Pincus, and 
William Greenhalgh—and the Development of Clinical Teaching Fellowships, 64 TENN. 
L. REV. 963, 965 (1997).  
19. The case method of legal education, first implemented (and likely developed) by 
Christopher Columbus Langdell during his tenure as Dean of Harvard Law School during 
the late Nineteenth Century, employs Socratic questioning to narrow students’ 
interpretations of appellate cases to develop legal analysis skills and doctrinal mastery. 
See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. 
REV. 517, 520–27 (1991). 
20. Colorado (1909), Massachusetts and Wyoming (1957), Connecticut and Michigan 
(1963), Florida and New Jersey (1964), New York (1965), Georgia, Iowa, Oklahoma, 
Minnesota, and Tennessee (1967), and District of Columbia (1968). Frank G. Avellone, 
The State of State Student Practice: Proposals for Reforming Ohio’s Legal Internship 
Rule, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 13 n.1 (1990). 
21. See generally ABA, Model Student Practice Rule, 94 REP. OF THE ABA 290 (1969).  
22. Id. at Section I. 
23. Id. at Section II.  
24. Id. at Section III. 
25. Id. at Section IV. 
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Hamlin that “law students can be expected to make a significant 
contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the 
poor in many areas.”26 Today, every state has a student practice rule and 
every law school has a clinical education program.27 
 
B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EXPERIENCE 
 
 The District of Columbia was among the earliest adopters of a student 
practice rule. An April 1968 proposal by the deans of the five District of 
Columbia law schools28 sought to amend what was then Local Rule 9629 
to allow third-year law students to represent indigent litigants. The Board 
of Judges for the Court of General Sessions passed a June 20, 1968 
resolution, by a vote of 12-2, stating that the Board supported “the 
principle of third year law student participation with members of the Bar 
present as counsel of record in the representation of indigents.”30 The 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, acting in its 
supervisory capacity, voted down the proposed amendment, apparently 
emphasizing the Board’s ambiguous conclusion rather than its stated 
philosophical support for student practice.31  
26. 407 U.S. 25 at 44 (1972).  
27. See Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/StudentPractice.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014). 
28. In re Application of the District of Columbia Law Schools, and Certain Other 
Interested Parties, For an Addition to Local Rule 96 of the United States District of 
Columbia to Allow for Special Appearances Without Compensation by Third Year Law 
Students on Behalf of Indigents in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, 
Local Rule 96, 1–2 (1968) (on file with author). B.J Tennery, American University 
Washington College of Law; Vernon X. Miller, Catholic University of America 
Columbus School of Law; C. Clyde Ferguson, Howard University Law School; Paul R. 
Dean, Georgetown University Law Center; and Robert Kramer, George Washington 
University National Law Center signed the petition. Also signing the petition were John 
E. Powell, President, Bar Association of the District of Columbia, and Peter H. Wolf, a 
principal drafter of the student practice rule. Id. At the time, there were only five law 
schools. Cf. id. The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of 
Law, founded as Antioch Law School, opened in 1972. School of Law History, UNIV. OF 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=History (last visited Jan. 8, 
2015). 
29. D.C. App. R. 96 (1967) then permitted only Bar-admitted lawyers to appear before 
the Court. 
30. Peter Wolf, D.C. Law School Students in the Courtroom, 36 D.C. B. J. 11, 42 (1969). 
31. Id. Apparently in response to the initial assertion by Board of Judges that no 
amendment was necessary to allow students to represent indigent clients in the Court of 
General Sessions, proponents of the amendment pointed out that the proposed change 
would be permissive, not mandatory: the updated rule would make it clear that the Court 
of General Sessions could permit students to represent indigents but that they would not 
be required to give such permission. The deans also described the immense and growing 
need for adequate legal representation of indigent litigants and cited examples of 
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During the summer of 1968, the Rules Committee for the Court of General 
Sessions proposed the following amendment, which the Board of Judges 
adopted on September 25, 1968 by a 12-2 vote: 
 
No person other than a member in good standing of the Bar of this 
Court shall be permitted to appear in this branch in a representative 
capacity except (1) for the purpose of securing a continuance, and 
except further (2) a third-year law student may participate fully in 
the representation of an indigent defendant, and in doing so may 
address the Court and interrogate witnesses, provided that a 
member of the Bar of this Court is present as counsel of record for 
the indigent defendant and is supervising the student’s 
participation.32 
 
On October 14, 1968, at the urging of Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, 
United States Senator from Maryland Joseph Tydings, United States 
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, other legal dignitaries, and numerous 
academics and legal nonprofits,33 the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia finally approved the change to the General Sessions 
rule in the form the Rules Committee recommended.  
 The original rule reflected a time when law school clinical courses 
were still experimental and when clinical field work took place only in the 
District of Columbia courts. This did not change when the student practice 
rule was rewritten and implemented after Court Reorganization in 197134 
to permit law students to practice in the new District of Columbia Superior 
Court and the new Court of Appeals.35 Nor did it change when minor 
revisions were made throughout the 1970s36 or when the larger revisions 
jurisdictions where student representation of such clients had been found adequate if not 
superior to other options. 
32. Wallace Mlyniec, Unlabeled in Law Students in Court Papers (unpublished 
manuscripts) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Law Students in Court Paper] 
(describing Law Students in the Court Clinic when Mlyniec worked as the Clinical 
Coordinator at Georgetown University Law Center). 
33. Peter Wolf, D.C. Law School Students in the Courtroom, 36 D.C. B. J. 11, 42–43 
(1969). 
34. Prior to Court Reorganization, District of Columbia courts were administered by the 
federal courts for the District of Columbia. After reorganization, the D.C. courts became 
independent and were treated similarly to state courts, although they remained courts of 
the United States pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution. Palmore v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 398–99 (1973). 
35. See, e.g., Superior Court of the District of Columbia Order, 99 DAILY WASH. L. 
REPORTER 1980  (Nov. 9, 1971); United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Order, 99 DAILY WASH. L. REPORTER 1980 (Nov. 9, 1971). 
36. See, e.g., Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 100 DAILY. WASH. L. 
REPORTER 2219 (Nov. 9, 1972.  
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occurred in 1982.37 Thus, the rules existing in the Superior Court and 
Court of Appeals rules that were subject to the 2014 amendments did not 
address the vast array of legal practice that exists today. 
 Law Students in Court (LSIC), the original law school clinical 
program in the District of Columbia, was founded in 1968 as a consortium 
program comprised of all of the D.C. law schools,38 in close connection 
with Rule 96s amendment the same year. Though the rule permitted 
student practice in any civil or criminal case, in the clinic’s early years 
LSIC staff supervised students from participating District of Columbia law 
schools only in Landlord and Tenant and Small Claims Court 
proceedings.39 After 1971, additional law school clinical courses focusing 
on many other subject matters were created at the law schools.40 The 
District of Columbia law schools became pioneers in providing students 
with opportunities to engage in supervised law practice through a wide 
array of clinical legal education courses. Today, the schools’ clinical 
offerings are far broader than what was contemplated at the time the 
student practice rule took its pre-amendment form in 1982.41 
 
II.  CHALLENGES TO STUDENT PRACTICE 
37. These revisions were proposed by the then-clinical deans and directors of the District 
of Columbia law schools. See Appendix A for the text of the 1982 version of D.C. App. 
R. 48. 
38. In the beginning, the Judges preferred that the schools pool their resources so that the 
court would have one point of contact. 
39. 3rd Yr. Students to Civil Courts? GEORGETOWN LAW WEEKLY, Feb. 15, 1968. In 
1972, LSIC launched a criminal justice division, which enabled students to represent 
individuals charged with misdemeanors punishable by no more than one year in prison. 
Law Students in Court Papers, supra note 32, at 2. 
40. See, for example, the Jacob Burns Community Clinics that were formed in 1971 on a 
wide range of other issues, including domestic violence and immigration.  The Jacob 
Burns Community Legal Clinics, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/academics/el/clinics/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 8, 
2015).  Antioch Law School, the District’s sixth law school, which was founded in 1972, 
created legal clinics pursuant to Rule 96. School of Law History, UNIV. OF THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA, http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=History (last visited Jan. 8, 2015). It later 
became the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. Id. 
41. See infra “Modernizing the District of Columbia Rule;” see also, e.g., Clinical 
Program, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014); Law Clinics, THE CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM., 
http://clinics.law.edu/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014); Our Clinics, GEORGETOWN LAW, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/our-
clinics/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014); The Jacob Burns Community Legal Clinics, THE 
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/academics/el/clinics/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014); Clinical Law Center, HOWARD UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.howard.edu/10 (last visited Jan. 8, 2015); Introduction to the Clinical 
Program, UNIV. OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID A. CLARKE SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=ClinicIntro (last visited Jan. 8, 2015). 
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 Challenges to student practice have arisen periodically since the 
inception of student practice rules, but courts have uniformly upheld the 
validity of the rules. Few challenges have arisen in civil cases;42 most 
have come in criminal and juvenile defendants’ motions for post-
conviction relief and in criminal and juvenile appeals. Appellants have 
alleged either (1) constitutional violations of either the absolute right to 
counsel43 or the right to effective assistance of counsel44 or (2) procedural 
or substantive breaches of the jurisdiction’s student practice rules.45  
 
A. CLAIMS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
 
Constitutional challenges to student practice have rested on either of 
two claims: (1) that representation by a student lawyer absent a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel constitutes a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment’s absolute guarantee;46 or (2) that a student’s 
participation made counsel unconstitutionally ineffective.47 Courts have 
sometimes responded to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims by 
assessing the supervising attorney’s effectiveness and by considering the 
student’s practice errors (procedural48 or substantive49) as one element in 
the Strickland analysis.50 Appellants have lost in those cases.51 
42. Student practice challenges in civil cases are rare. In Hayden v. Elam, 739 So.2d 
1088, 1093–94 (Ala. 1999), an unsuccessful civil defendant moved for a new trial, 
alleging that he was denied a fair trial due to a statement the plaintiff’s student-attorney 
made during her closing argument. The student had argued that a claim the defendant 
corporation made on a tax return was made “under penalty of perjury.” The court noted 
that the student and supervising attorney had not complied with the letter of the law when 
the student entered her appearance for the plaintiff-appellee. Nonetheless, the court found 
that the student had not accused the defendant-appellant of perjury and that her argument 
had not created sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. Id. at 1093. In Haro-Ramos v. 
INS, 44 F. App’x 168, 170 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit upheld a deportation order 
where the record provided no evidence concerning the student’s compliance with the 
state student practice rule. 
43. E.g., People v. Nelson, 156 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
44. E.g., United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1994). 
45. E.g., People v. Flemming, No. A130683, 2013 WL 940361, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 
March 12, 2013). 
46. E.g., id. 
47. E.g., Rimell, 21 F.3d at 284. 
48. In re Denzel W., 930 N.E.2d 974, 983 (Ill. 2010). 
49. Matter of Moore, 380 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Hudson v. State, 375 So. 
2d 355, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
50. Strickland v. Washington established that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel is violated where counsel is objectively deficient and there is a 
reasonable probability that the attorney’s errors prejudiced the outcome of the case. 466 
U.S. 668, 693–96 (1984). 
51. Moore, 380 N.E.2d at 921; Hudson, 375 So. 2d at 355. 
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 Claims that student representation amounts to a constitutional 
violation unless the defendant has waived his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel have failed because courts have recognized that the supervising 
attorney’s presence and participation fulfills the constitutional mandate.52 
Courts have therefore been unwilling to require a showing that an 
appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he 
consented to a student’s participation in his defense.53  
 Appellants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel have argued that 
courts should deem counsel ineffective per se where attorneys fail to 
strictly comply with a student practice rule’s procedural requirements.54 
No court has accepted that argument,55 and the Denzel W. court specified 
that the Strickland56 test—not a per se rule—should determine the issue.57  
 
B. CLAIMS BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF STUDENT PRACTICE RULES 
 
 Challenges based on violations of state student practice rules have 
usually relied on claims that failure to comport with rule-mandated 
procedure—most commonly, failure to obtain or file the defendant’s 
written consent—should invalidate a verdict against the party represented 
52. See, e.g., People v. Flemming, No. A130683, 2013 WL 940361, at *9  (Cal. Ct. App. 
March 12, 2013); Gartman v. Pierce, No. 05-CV-3123, 2012 WL 1932118, at *23 (N.D. 
Ill. May 29, 2012); People v. Nelson, 156 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 
People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 138 (1979). 
53. See Flemming, 2013 WL 940361 at *9; Gartman, 2012 WL 1932118 at *23; Perez, 
24 Cal. 3d at 144. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (establishing that 
a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent). 
In State v. Edwards, 351 So. 2d 500 (La. 1977), the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected 
an appellant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel when a student-
attorney represented him at a pretrial suppression hearing without a supervising attorney 
present. Although the court found that the defendant had not consented in writing to the 
student’s participation, it upheld the conviction because it concluded the violation of the 
court rule did not constitute a constitutional violation. 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Denzel W., 
930 N.E.2d 974, 984 (Ill. 2010). 
55. See, e.g., Rimell, 21 F.3d at 286; Denzel W., 930 N.E.2d at 984. 
56. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693–96 (1984). 
57. Denzel W., 930 N.E.2d at 984; see also Duval v. State, 744 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1999) (applying Strickland to conclude that a failure to file defendant’s written 
consent to student’s participation did not make counsel ineffective, where appellant did 
not allege actual ineffectiveness). At least once, an appellate court has reversed a 
conviction obtained while the defendant was represented by a student because the trial 
court had prevented the defendant from obtaining constitutionally adequate counsel. In 
City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 100 Wash. 2d 212 (1983), the trial court required a student to 
represent a defendant unsupervised despite the student’s claim that he would not be able 
to supply effective counsel. However, the counsel provided was substantively ineffective 
because the student, who was representing the defendant in a different action and was 
summoned to court when the defendant appeared alone, was unfamiliar with the case—
not because of the student’s status. Id. at 221. 
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by a student.58 Appellants who have brought such claims have lost either 
because the court has found sufficient compliance with the rule or because 
noncompliance did not prejudice the defendant.59 
 Appellants have succeeded where they have shown they were unaware 
that they were being represented by students60 and where courts have 
placed the burden of persuasion on appellees to refute allegations that 
appellants had not actually consented to student participation.61 In one 
such case, the student was unsupervised.62 In others, students 
misrepresented their statuses to the defendant and/or the court.63 Florida’s 
58. See In re Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d 539, 542 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dwyer, 
512 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); cf. Hayden v. Elam, 739 So. 2d 1088, 1093 
(Ala. 1999) (finding that by failing to file a revised updated consent form after the 
supervising attorney was replaced, counsel for a civil plaintiff denied the trial court the 
chance to determine whether it was appropriate to allow a student to participate in the 
proceedings (one of the purposes stated in the student practice rule), but that the error did 
not warrant a new trial for the defendant-appellant). 
59. People v. Flemming, No. A130683, 2013 WL 940361, at *8  (Cal. Ct. App. March 
12, 2013); Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d at 542; Dwyer, 512 N.W.2d at 824 (invoking “no 
harm, no foul” reasoning); State v. Daniels, 346 So. 2d 672, 674 (La. 1977); see also 
Gartman v. Pierce, No. 05-CV-3123, 2012 WL 1932118, at *23 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2012) 
(ruling against a habeas petitioner who at first claimed no actual consent but then 
changed his argument to allege failure of procedural consent to his student lawyer’s 
participation at trial). 
60. In Matter of Moore, the Illinois court of appeals vacated a decision ordering an 
individual committed for mental treatment, on the grounds that neither the defendant nor 
the lower court judge actually knew the defendant’s appointed counsel was a student. 380 
N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). The student was identified as such at the first 
hearing but thereafter, before a different judge who presided over the jury trial, he was 
identified as an “assistant public defender.” Id. at 900. The student was appointed to 
second-chair at the trial over the defendant’s request to represent himself. Id. See also 
Hudson v. State, 375 So. 2d 355, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing where the appellant claimed students represented him at trial 
“without his knowledge or consent”). The Hudson court relied on Cheatham v. State, 364 
So. 2d 83, 83–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), and Huckleberry v. State, 337 So. 2d 400, 
401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). In Cheatham, a Florida appeals court overturned denial of 
an aggravated assault defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief because the state 
failed to refute the appellant’s claim that he had not been informed of or consented to 
representation by a legal intern. 364 So. 2d at 84. The student had not been supervised by 
a licensed attorney. Id. at 83. In Huckleberry, a Florida District Court of Appeals vacated 
judgment against a defendant who had pled guilty to first-degree murder under the advice 
of court-appointed counsel. The public defender whom the court initially appointed 
delegated the duty to a recent law school graduate who had passed the bar exam but 
failed to meet the state bar’s character requirements. Huckleberry, 337 So. 2d at 402. 
Neither the court nor the defendant was aware at the time the defendant entered his plea 
that the defendant’s counsel was not a member of the bar. Id. at 401. 
61. In Interest of C.B., 546 So. 2d 447, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Schlaiss, 
528 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Cheatham, 364 So. 2d at 83–84. 
62. Cheatham, 364 So. 2d at 83. 
63. Schlaiss, 528 N.E.2d at 336 (student was accompanied by a licensed attorney but 
introduced himself to the court as an “assistant public defender”). 
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Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed a conviction, finding 
insufficient evidence to refute an appellant’s claim of no consent, despite 
the student attorney’s testimony that the defendant had had actual notice 
of the student’s status.64  
 Less common among challenges under state student practice rules are 
claims alleging that a student’s participation in legal proceedings at all 
constitutes unauthorized practice of law.65 In People v. Perez, the 
California Supreme Court rejected a claim that a student’s participation in 
the appellant’s trial abrogated the appellant’s constitutional right to 
counsel.66 The court highlighted the rule’s drafters’ care in protecting the 
right to counsel and asserted in dicta that a student’s participation in court 
proceedings was not necessarily unauthorized practice of law merely 
because the court had not yet formally accepted the student practice rule 
promulgated by the state bar.67 The Perez court elected not to resolve the 
unauthorized practice issue because the law student had appeared in good 
faith pursuant to the Bar rule.68 Perez upheld the defendant’s conviction 
because the defendant had consented to the student’s appearance and 
received competent representation.69 
 Other challenges have arisen in the course of students’ representation 
of clients that have not been recorded in decisional law. Such challenges 
include complaints that have struck at the scope of student practice rules.70 
Opponents of student-represented litigants have attempted to claim that 
students may not represent certain classes of clients, such as nonprofit 
corporations; others have taken issue with definitions of indigence, 
alleging that an opposing party does not clear the common threshold of 
eligibility for student representation. We know of no appellate case that 
has addressed such complaints. 
 
III.   MODERNIZING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULE 
 
A. THE PROCESS 
 
 With the history of the District of Columbia rule and challenges to 
student practice rules in mind, a group of professors and clinical deans and 
directors from the District of Columbia law schools formed an ad-hoc 
committee in 2008 to re-examine the District of Columbia student practice 
64. In Interest of C.B., 546 So. 2d at 447. 
65. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 143 (1979). 
66. See generally Perez, 24 Cal. 3d at 133. 
67. Id. at 136. 
68. Id. at 143. 
69. Id. 
70. These examples have been obtained by the author though conversations with clinical 
teachers and statements made at various clinical conferences.  
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rules.71 The original rules and later revisions reflected times in which law 
school clinical courses were still experimental and when clinical students 
practiced in only the District of Columbia courts. The District of Columbia 
Access to Justice Commission had noted that law school clinical programs 
were important service providers in a city where the legal needs of the 
poor and middle class were seldom met; however, the existing student 
practice rules did not appear to reflect the important and expanding role 
clinical programs play in providing representation to under-served 
populations.72 Recent changes in the District of Columbia Unauthorized 
Practice Rules73 and the maturation of clinical education nationwide and 
in the District of Columbia suggested that the District of Columbia student 
practice rules74 had not kept pace with pedagogical innovations or the 
evolution of legal practice. 
 The ad-hoc committee’s goals were to review the District of Columbia 
Courts’ student practice rules to determine which parts no longer reflected 
nationwide trends in legal education and student practice and which were 
no longer consistent with other D.C. Bar rules implemented after the 
District of Columbia student rules were last amended. The ad-hoc 
committee agreed that if it found the rules were in need of revision, it 
would draft proposed amendments. Those amendments, if required, would 
reflect the prevailing models of state student practice rules and best 
71. Faculty members who worked on the project were Robert Dinerstein from American 
University Washington College of Law; Catherine Klein from Catholic University 
Columbus School of Law; Karen Foreman and Joseph Tulman from the University of the 
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law; Jane Aiken, Deborah Epstein, and 
Wallace Mlyniec from Georgetown University Law Center; Phyllis Goldfarb from 
George Washington Law School; and Tamar Meekins from Howard University Law 
School. Mark Carlin, former Chair of the Committee on Admissions, also assisted with 
the project. 
72. The services clinical programs provide to the court and to citizens of the District of 
Columbia should not be underestimated. Clinical education programs save the courts and 
the city hundreds of thousands of dollars yearly. Moreover, the activities of the clinical 
education programs have strengthened the cause of justice, improved the lives of 
countless citizens, and better prepared students for the practice of law. Students are 
important legal service providers in the initiatives of the District of Columbia Access to 
Justice Commission. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 42; see also id. at 43–82. The 
clinics also inculcate in students the best traditions of the legal profession and create the 
foundation for a lifetime of pro bono service. In short, clinical education programs are 
significant participants in the legal culture of the region and in the administration of 
justice.  
73. See D.C. App. R. 49. Some members of the ad-hoc committee also believed that a 
comparison of the student practice rules and the unauthorized practice rules indicated 
gaps between the two sets of rules that suggested that some clinical students might be 
practicing without lawful authority. 
74. See D.C. App. R. 48. 
 14 
                                                 
 
 
practices in clinical education.75 The new rules would also continue to 
guarantee the exemplary practice that for years students had rendered to 
courts, agencies, and clients, and would comport with the definition of 
“the practice of law” set forth in the District of Columbia Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Rules.76 Finally, the amendments would recognize the 
evolution and success of area law schools’ programs, modernize the rule 
and make it consistent with best practices, and recognize the growing need 
for additional legal services for people with low incomes. 
 The ad-hoc committee met from time to time to consider the rules. It 
quickly determined that the District of Columbia student practice rules, 
once a progressive and innovative model for other states to emulate, had 
lagged behind other rules’ developments, leaving it one of the most 
restrictive student practice rules in the country. The District of Columbia 
rules, unlike the rules in other states, unnecessarily limited student and 
client eligibility and were vague concerning transactional practice and a 
student’s ability to give legal advice in matters not destined to become 
legal conflicts. The rules did not clearly authorize practice in non-District 
of Columbia fora, and they required students to be screened for character 
in a manner that was costly, cumbersome, and inconsistent with practices 
in other states. Though the programs and practices of clinical faculty in the 
District of Columbia had become models for clinical program design and 
75. See generally ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, A 
VISION AND A ROAD MAP (2007) available at 
http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best_practices-full.pdf. A second edition 
of Best Practices will appear in late 2014. 
76. The Unauthorized Practice Rule defines the “practice of law” as “the provision of 
professional legal advice or services where there is a client relationship of trust or 
reliance” and provides that “[o]ne is presumed to be practicing law when engaging in any 
of the following conduct on behalf of another: 
 
(A) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages, 
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other instruments 
intended to affect interests in real or personal property, wills, codicils, 
instruments intended to affect the disposition of property of decedents’ 
estates, other instruments intended to affect or secure legal rights, and 
contracts except routine agreements incidental to a regular course of 
business; 
 (B) Preparing or expressing legal opinions; 
 (C) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal; 
 (D) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or 
any written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of law, 
for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal; 
 (E) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities 
described in sub-paragraph (A) through (D) might be done, or whether 
they were done, in accordance with applicable law; 
 (F) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to 
render the services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e) above.” 
D.C. App. R. 49(b). 
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pedagogy throughout the country, the rules did not recognize how 
sophisticated clinical pedagogy had become. This shortcoming was not the 
result of anyone’s negligence. The clinical programs and the courts 
worked splendidly together throughout the early existence of the rules. 
Because of the absence of any conflict, no one had bothered to take a hard 
look at the rules for a very long time. 
 It took several years for the ad-hoc committee to draft a set of 
amendments that were generally acceptable to the clinical faculties of each 
school. With the proposed amendments in hand, I, representing the ad-hoc 
committee, began meeting in April 2011 with the Honorable John R. 
Fisher, Associate Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and 
Chair of its Rules Committee, to further refine the ad-hoc committee’s 
work. Discussion between the Court and the ad-hoc committee occurred in 
three phases: The first phase consisted of a several-year conversation 
between Judge Fisher and me. The second involved similar conversations 
between the Court’s Rules Committee77 and me, followed by a 
presentation before the Board of Judges. During and after each stage, I 
reported back to the committee for additional guidance and continued the 
discussions with the judges. Once the ad-hoc committee and the judges 
reached agreement, the Board issued an Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to invite public comment.78 The final phase of the ad-hoc 
committee’s work involved discussions among Judge Fisher, Judge 
McLeese, and me, with guidance from the ad-hoc committee, regarding 
the comments the Court received from the public. Most of the public 
comments received by the Court were supportive of student practice and 
of the amendments, and thus, they merely supported the conclusions of the 
Court and the ad-hoc committee. The District of Columbia Bar and the pro 
bono community made more significant comments, with the former 
requesting tighter restrictions on supervisors than the amendments 
proposed, and the latter requesting that the Court expand the proposed rule 
to provide clients greater access to students. 
 The original amendments to the rules the ad-hoc committee proposed 
were not immediately accepted by the judges, and the proposal changed 
over time. Each iteration of the proposed amendments underwent new 
debate and consideration by the ad-hoc committee, guided by the goal of 
devising a set of amendments that would regulate student practice in the 
areas of law in which the clinical programs were currently providing 
77. The Court’s committee was composed of Judge Fisher and Associate Judges 
Catharine F. Easterly, Roy W. McLeese III, and Kathryn A. Oberly. When the ad-hoc 
committee’s discussions with the Board of Judges began, Judge Fisher was the chair. By 
the time the amendments were finalized, Judge McLeese had become the chair. 
78. Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Student Practice), No. M-237-10 (D.C. 
Oct. 31, 2013). 
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representation79 and expand the number of low-income clients clinics and 
their students could represent. Differences between the judges and the ad-
hoc committee were resolved when proponents of one or another view 
were more persuasive, when the ad-hoc committee and the judges reached 
a compromise position that satisfied the schools and the Court, or when 
the judges determined to follow their own approach despite disagreement 
with members of the ad-hoc committee. Throughout the process, 
Associate Judge John Fisher and I remained the principal revisers of the 
amendments. The conversations were never acrimonious. Rather, our 
conversations were intellectual and philosophical discussions about the 
nature of the bar, the limits and responsibilities of law schools, and the 
intersection between the two when it came to student practice. In the end, 
our disagreements were small and we arrived at consensus about most 
issues with little discussion. 
 
B. THE AMENDMENTS 
 
 The proposed amendments considered (1) case, client, and student 
eligibility; (2) the admission and certification process; (3) fees and 
payments for services; and (4) supervisor qualifications. The ad-hoc 
committee believed the proposed amendments should provide consistency 
between the student practice rules and current law school practices and 
should make the rules consistent with best practices and student practice 
rules currently in force throughout the country. The remainder of this 
article provides an analysis of each proposed amendment, a description of 
the final product, and analyses of the two issues that proved most difficult 
to resolve.  
1. ELIGIBILITY FOR REPRESENTATION 
 
 The practice of law and the nature of clinical education had changed 
dramatically between 1982, when the District of Columbia student 
practice rules were last updated, and 2008, when the ad-hoc committee 
began considering new amendments. The number of clinical courses had 
grown, and the nature of their work was no longer confined to the practice 
of criminal law and representation in small claims and landlord-tenant 
matters in local courts. Pursuant to special student practice rules, clinical 
programs had expanded their work into federal, international, and non-
District of Columbia state courts, into state and federal legislative bodies, 
and into federal and state agencies. For example, students were litigating 
79. As noted infra notes 87–89, the rules as originally written and existing in 2014 were 
directed primarily at cases involving litigation in the courts. The requirements regarding 
representation in non-litigation matters were vague.  
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in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,80 the United States 
Immigration Court,81 Maryland state courts,82 the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia,83 and the United States Appellate 
Courts in the District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits.84 In addition to 
traditional court and agency matters, law students were working on 
community development projects, tenant conversions of property, small 
business development, tax preparation, and many other forms of legal 
work that required client counseling, drafting, and advocacy under the 
supervision of clinical faculty. In some clinics, students took primary 
responsibility for their cases in other tribunals just as they did for their 
cases in the District of Columbia Superior Court. In a few, they acted as 
law clerks in much the same way law students function in law firms.85  
 These changes in the academy mirrored the changes in modern law 
practice. In the early years of clinical education, law practice was directed 
toward litigation and based primarily on common-law concepts. Today, 
modern law practice is transnational, multi-jurisdictional, regulatory, 
transactional, and dominated by settlement-oriented resolutions.86 
Moreover, much legal work today is engendered by mutual advantage, not 
by dispute. Such practice is based less on common-law principles than on 
regulatory and legislative enactments and principles of cooperation and 
contract. Although the 1982 student practice rules were read to cover such 
diverse practices, they were vague and open to contradictory 
80. See International Human Rights Law Clinic, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/inter.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2014); see also 
Charlotte Cassel, Human Rights Clinic Participates in Hearing on Stand Your Ground 
Laws Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, MIAMI LAW NEWS (Apr, 
15, 2014), http://www.law.miami.edu/news/2014/april/2764.php. 
81. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1292.1, 292.1 (governing practice before the United States 
Immigration Court). 
82. Cf. MD. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR R. 16. 
83. See, e.g., Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (D.D.C. 2006). 
84. Students practicing in federal courts do so pursuant to the student rules of the various 
federal circuits relating to “non-lawyers.” See, e.g., D.C. Cir. R. 46 (2013); cf. Sperry v. 
Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Bridges, 759 A.2d 
233 (Md. 2000); Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n of Montgomery Cnty., 561 A.2d 200 (Md. 1989). 
85. Students acting merely as law clerks need not be certified pursuant to the D.C. student 
practice rules since they are not practicing law as defined by the Unauthorized Practice 
Rule. See Commentary to D.C. App. R. § 49(b)(2). They give no advice to clients, do not 
appear in court, and do not sign legal documents. 
86. See generally CONSTANCE BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY: HOW TO USE THE LAW TO 
CREATE VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND MANAGE RISK (2013); CARRIE MENKEL-
MEADOW, Foundations of Dispute Resolution, 1 COMPLEX DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141965 (tracing the theory that dispute resolution 
need not be zero-sum to Western cultural revolution in the 1980s); Lon Fuller, The Form 
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARVARD L. REV. 2, 394–404 (1978) (describing 
“polycentric” legal problems and positing that some are too complex to be resolved 
through litigation). 
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interpretations. For example, the 1982 rules permitted students to practice 
in any civil case but seemed to qualify that by referring to cases “which 
may be pending in any court or administrative tribunal.”87 The rules also 
permitted students to prepare pleadings and other documents, but again 
seemed to refer only to documents that would be filed in pending cases.88 
Some read the rule broadly by asserting that any legal matters could end 
up in a court case; others advanced a stricter interpretation, saying that 
student practice was limited to cases actually in or pending litigation. The 
ad-hoc committee sought greater specificity regarding the authority for 
students to practice in non-litigation matters so that the lower courts, 
administrative tribunals, opposing lawyers, and the Bar would understand 
the scope of student practice. Clarification would also give law schools 
clear guidance as they developed and expanded their clinical programs to 
meet the needs of underserved individuals and non-profit organizations.89  
 Recent changes in the Court’s Unauthorized Practice Rule90 
established that the practice of law in the District of Columbia was not 
confined to appearances before District of Columbia courts. Rule 49 states 
that giving legal advice while occupying a law office in the District of 
Columbia is the “practice of law,” whether or not litigation is 
contemplated and irrespective of the fora in which litigation may occur.91 
If the 1982 student practice rules were narrowly interpreted, once could 
argue that students were violating the unauthorized practice rules by 
providing representation in areas not specially touching on cases in or 
pending litigation. Given the wide-ranging practices of contemporary 
clinical education programs, the ad-hoc committee believed it would be 
prudent for the student practice rules to reflect the general propositions of 
the unauthorized practice rules. 
 When drafting the 2014 amendments, the ad-hoc committee wanted to 
ensure that the new rules anticipated the expansion of clinical programs to 
meet the unmet legal needs of District of Columbia citizens and the 
evolving educational needs of students.92 The ad-hoc committee believed 
students were capable of providing quality representation in expanded 
areas of practice. During the 45 years of the rule’s existence, the quality of 
87. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1) (1982). 
88. Id. 
89. Knowing, understanding, and complying with the Court’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct and Unauthorized Practice play a significant role in clinical legal education. 
Clarity in the rules assists in that training. 
90. D.C. App. R. 49. 
91. See D.C. App. R. 49(b)(3). The Unauthorized Practice Rule recognize some 
exceptions to this general rule. See D.C. App. R. 49(c). Most pertinent are those rules 
regarding federal practice. 
92. The value of clinical education was first noted by the U. S. Supreme Court in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); see also JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra n.2, passim. 
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the students’ representation of and dedication to their clients had seldom, 
if ever, been seriously questioned. To the best of the ad-hoc committee’s 
knowledge, no student had ever been sanctioned by either the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals or the District of Columbia Superior Court, or 
had his or her license revoked pursuant to the student practice rules. The 
ad-hoc committee also knew that students had performed admirably 
throughout the country in all areas of practice93 and that the case law 
surrounding student practice rules recognized that students provided 
exemplary services.94 The directors of the law school clinics knew of no 
students in the District of Columbia who had ever being denied a student 
license.95 Faculty clinical supervisors were experienced practitioners in 
their fields, and the quality of faculty supervision at District of Columbia 
law schools had always been considered exemplary. Indeed, judges of the 
District of Columbia and federal courts praised students and faculty for 
their work and often requested that students take on additional clients.  
 There was never any doubt that the partnership between the courts and 
the law schools, which began as an experiment in the 1960s, had 
succeeded beyond all measure. Today almost every law school in the 
United States has some form of clinical program and every state has a 
student practice rule.96 The American Bar Association Accreditation 
Standards97 require that law schools provide skills training,98 and 
recognize the educational value of live-client clinical opportunities,99 
simulation courses,100 and field placement programs.101 The ABA’s 
MacCrate Report has called on law schools to pay more attention to 
teaching legal skills and values in law school,102 and a recent Carnegie 
93. Indeed, nationwide, we know of no student who has ever had his or her license 
revoked for misfeasance or poor performance. Instances of poor performance have 
occasionally been handled inside the law school. Clinical Education Listserv, lawclinic-
bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Jan. 24 – Jan. 31, 2009) (on file with the author) (providing 
results from the discussion of the clinical teachers).  
94. See, e.g., Santiago v. Pinello, 647 F. Supp. 2d 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[S]tudents 
have provided exemplary representation of the plaintiff.”). 
95. Mark Carlin does not recall any student being denied admission during his tenure as 
chair. Interview with Mark Carlin, Chair, District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
Committee on Admission, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 2009). One student with 
multiple criminal convictions did apply but chose not to submit clarifying information to 
the Committee on Admissions.  Interview with Tamar Meekins, Professor, Howard Law 
School, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 10, 2009). 
96. See, e.g., Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27.  
97. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 15–25. 
98. Id. at 15 (Standard 302(d)). 
99. Id. at 17 (Standard 304). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 18 (Standard 305). 
102. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 
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Foundation Report, Educating Lawyers, Preparation for the Profession of 
Law, calls for an expansion of clinical courses throughout American law 
schools’ curricula.103 In addition, the recently published Best Practices for 
Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map advocates an integrated 
curriculum where theory and practice are merged and where 
professionalism is taught pervasively throughout all three years of law 
school.104  
 Expanding the student practice rules to allow representation of clients 
in any form of law practice met with no resistance during the ad-hoc 
committee’s discussions with the court and was endorsed by public 
commenters. The judges, like the law professors, were aware that law 
practice, especially in a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, was no 
longer confined to litigation. Given that the Court had recently amended 
its rules to provide a comprehensive definition of law practice, and given 
that law students had to be prepared to practice in a multi-national world 
where law practice encompassed much more than litigation, the judges 
agreed that the rule should permit students to practice, with supervision, in 
the same way members of the bar do. Thus, the amended student practice 
rule adopted the broad definition of the practice of law contained in Rule 
49 and permitted student representation in the following: 
 
(i) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages, 
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other 
instruments intended to affect interests in real or personal property, 
wills, codicils, instruments intended to affect the disposition of 
property of decedents’ estates, and other instruments intended to affect 
or secure legal rights; 
 (ii) Preparing or expressing legal opinions; 
 (iii) Appearing before any tribunal that permits student practice; 
 (iv) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or 
any written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of 
law, for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal that 
permits student practice; 
(v) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities 
described in sub-paragraph (A) through (D) might be done, and 
whether they were done, in accordance with applicable law.105 
 
 The one exception that remains is the limitation on representation in 
criminal cases. Both the law professors and the judges acknowledged that 
(REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE 
GAP) (1992) [hereinafter AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM]. 
103. WILLIAM SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS, PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW ch. 5 (2007). 
104. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75, at 97–98. 
105. See D.C. App. R. 48(a)(3). 
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the possibility of long sentences in felony cases made the stakes too high 
to permit representation by students. Thus, students practicing in the adult 
criminal trial court are permitted to represent only those people charged 
with misdemeanor offenses.106 This limitation, however, does not apply to 
representation in adult probation revocation cases, prison administrative 
hearings, or appeals.107 The felony limitation does not exist in juvenile 
delinquency cases because the penalties are not as harsh.108 
 Although Rule 49 and the amended Rule 48 applied to all aspects of 
practice within the District of Columbia, the Court recognized that it could 
not control practice before other tribunals and that those other tribunals in 
which the students might practice had an interest in regulating and a 
responsibility to regulate students’ work. Thus, the amended rule permits 
these other tribunals to regulate the eligibility of students, supervisors, and 
clients, and to regulate the quality of student practice.109 All students 
practicing in the District of Columbia will, however, be subject to both the 
ethical rules of the tribunals in which they practice and the D.C. Rules of 
Professional Conduct.110 Moreover, the rule mandates that, in all business 
documents, students give prominent notice of their student status and that 
their practice is limited to matters related to the District of Columbia or 
another state, federal, or foreign court or agency that permits their 
participation.111 
 
a. The Students 
 
i. Year in School 
 
 The original District of Columbia student practice rules permitted only 
third-year students to be admitted to practice. In 1982, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals amended the rules to permit students to 
practice in the second semester of the second year of law school.112 
Recognizing that no second-semester second-year student had been 
sanctioned by any court in the District of Columbia, the ad-hoc 
committee’s proposed amendments permitted all second-year students to 
participate in a clinical program.  
 In formulating their student practice rules, several states have 
recognized that the foundational skill of legal analysis is essentially 
106. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1). 
107. See id. 
108. D.C. CODE § 16-2320(c) (2014). The misdemeanor restriction was embodied in the 
1982 rule as well. 
109. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1)(i). 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2). 
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mastered by the end of the first year of law school, even though legal 
analysis continues to be taught in elective courses in the second and third 
years. Given the nature of most second-year courses, there is little to 
distinguish a second-semester second-year student from a first-semester 
second-year student. Non-clinical courses in both semesters in the second 
year tend to stress legal analysis and offer students little more than 
additional substantive knowledge in subject matters that are seldom the 
subjects of clinic courses. Recognizing these phenomena, a number of 
states113 permit students in some or all circumstances to represent clients 
after completing the first year of law school. The District of Columbia 
Superior Court had also authorized students in either semester of the 
second year to provide representation to convicted and incarcerated 
children and adults in disciplinary and probation revocation hearings.114   
 The Carnegie Report on legal education noted that permitting students 
to gain practical client experiences early in their law school careers would 
improve the overall quality of practice in the United States.115 The 
combination of training by clinic faculty and character screening by law 
schools has demonstrated that students who take clinic courses, whether in 
the second year or third year, are prepared to provide quality legal 
representation and to uphold the professional ethics and values of the bar. 
Such was the case with second-semester, second-year students in D.C. 
clinics.  
 Ad-hoc committee members’ conversations with clinical teachers in 
states that permitted second-year students to practice revealed that such 
students performed their clinic duties well despite their somewhat limited 
law school experience, and that they were generally welcomed by courts. 
Moreover, the sophistication of clinical pedagogy today and the quality of 
the clinical programs in District of Columbia law schools have eliminated 
the competency problems that some anticipated when the District’s rule 
was first promulgated. 
 The ad-hoc committee believed that relaxing the student eligibility 
standards to permit any second-year student to participate in a clinic 
would have a salutary effect on legal education, provide long-term 
benefits to the practicing bar, and have no negative effect on student 
performance or client interests. It would also expand the number of low- 
and moderate-income clients a clinic could represent.116 Based on the 
113. California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Mexico, and New York. Rules cited throughout this report may be found at Student 
Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27. 
114. Admin. Orders 07-19, 07-20, and 07-21, D.C. Super. Ct. (2007). The Superior Court 
acted pursuant to the power granted by D.C. App. R. 49(c) (10). 
115. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 103, passim. 
116. The Access to Justice Commission has called for expanding the services available to 
under-represented people. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 12. 
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findings of the Access to Justice Commission, the recent administrative 
orders of the Superior Court, and the positive experiences of students and 
tribunals in other states with relaxed eligibility rules, the ad-hoc 
committee believed that this modest change would produce only positive 
results. 
 Altering the year-in-school requirement required little discussion by 
the judges and garnered no objections during the public comment period. 
The combination of the success of using first-semester, second-year 
students in other jurisdictions and the efficacy of student practice in the 
District for the past forty-five years easily convinced the judges that first-
semester, second-year students who were properly trained and supervised 
in a clinic course could provide competent representation for clients. The 
final language permitted students to represent clients after they had 
completed one-third of their legal studies.117  
 
ii. Prerequisite Course Requirements 
 
 Because the original rule was litigation-based, it required every 
student, no matter what kind of clinic he or she intended to join, to have 
completed studies in civil procedure, criminal procedure, and evidence.118 
Due to changes in law school curricula, development of clinical pedagogy, 
and expansion of clinical courses, such prerequisites were not always 
germane to the areas of law in which clinics’ students practiced. For 
example, rules of evidence are relaxed in many administrative hearings 
and have little to do with tax preparation or business formation; courses in 
American civil procedure are not directly useful for students working in 
international human rights, tax, or legislative clinics; and criminal 
procedure is not needed for practice in civil, legislative, or policy clinics.  
 The proposed amendments sought to eliminate specific course 
requirements for students in all types of clinical programs. When the 
District of Columbia student practice rules were originally promulgated, 
law school curricula were rather static in their approach to instruction,119 
and classroom components of early clinical courses were either non-
existent or experimental. Thus, it was reasonable for drafters of the 
original rule, contemplating an active District of Columbia court practice, 
to require instruction in evidence, criminal procedure, and civil procedure 
as prerequisites for students seeking to represent clients pursuant to 
student practice rules.120 The drafters believed these prerequisite courses 
117. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2); see Appendix B. 
118. Although the rule said “studies,” not “courses,” it was generally understood to 
require a course that taught those subjects. 
119. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 1–6, 47–59. 
120. See D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2). 
 24 
                                                 
 
 
guaranteed that the students would possess some level of competence 
before they joined the clinic. 
 In many other states, student practice rules once required similar 
course prerequisites. However, state bars have recognized that well-
structured clinical programs provide better training for client 
representation than do first-year survey courses. That is one reason forty 
states and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit no longer require specific law school courses prior to clinic 
participation.121 Only two of the states that do require prerequisite courses 
specify courses identical to those the 1982 version of the D.C. rules 
required.122  
 At some District of Columbia law schools, courses are no longer 
limited to single legal subject matters.123 Civil and criminal procedure 
courses are sometimes taught as one Meta-Procedure class. Criminal law 
and procedure are sometimes taught together with other forms of 
government regulation. In many American law schools, Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence are now elective courses rather than required.  
 There is also an increasing recognition that foundational survey 
courses, such as those that were required by the 1982 version of the 
District of Columbia student practice rules, teach little more than legal 
analysis about the practice of law.124 Many schools have added new 
courses with practical skills components to balance the emphasis on 
theory, and legal writing courses are more sophisticated than they once 
were. Even though upper-class curricula now feature more problem-
solving, experiential, and multidisciplinary courses than they did in the 
past, students learn to merge theory and practice principally in their 
clinical courses. The relevant substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law 
and skills related to practice are now taught in-depth in the classroom 
components of clinics, in case-rounds, and in the weekly individual 
faculty-student supervision sessions that are the hallmark of clinical 
pedagogy. Thus, the prerequisite courses required by the pre-amendment 
rule are less important now to students’ preparation for representation than 
they were when earlier versions of the rule were promulgated. The District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals itself has recognized as much by granting 
waivers of the prerequisite courses upon a petition by applicants to clinical 
courses. However, the cost in filing fees and administrative action and the 
121. States requiring prerequisite courses are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. 
Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27.  
122. Arizona and Arkansas. Florida requires knowledge in these same subjects but not 
separate courses. Id. 
123. At Georgetown, for example, one section of the first-year curriculum combines 
several traditional subjects. Students in that section learn Contracts and Torts in one 
course. 
124. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 103, at ch. 3. 
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time lost to students in clinic courses while awaiting the Court’s waiver 
order seemed unnecessary and counterproductive.  
 Clinic professors, the Bar, and the courts need assurance that students 
are trained to perform with a high degree of competence when they 
undertake legal work for a client; but it is the clinical course curriculum, 
training, and supervision—not course prerequisites—that provide that 
assurance. In clinics, students thoroughly learn lawyering skills and the 
substantive law supporting those skills, through diverse methods of 
clinical pedagogy. Many clinical courses have their own pre- and co-
requisite courses and/or pre-clinic orientation classes that require more 
hours of instruction in law, evidence, and procedure than a typical first-
year classroom course provides. Once the orientation ends and the 
semester begins, students spend twenty to sixty hours per week, depending 
on the course’s credit allotment, on clinic-related learning. Some learning 
occurs in the classroom, where the substantive and procedural law relating 
to clinic cases and projects are discussed and critiqued. Much occurs in the 
weekly student-faculty case supervision sessions, where law is translated 
into case theory and strategy, and where execution of that strategy is 
mooted. In addition, students learn a great deal about theory integrated 
with practice during discussions prompted by multiple drafts of contracts, 
pleadings and motions; direct and cross examination questions; briefs and 
policy papers; and mooting student-prepared arguments, negotiations, and 
legislative testimony. Of course, learning also occurs during appearances 
before courts, legislatures, and agencies and in client counseling sessions, 
where theory and practice come together to advance a client’s interests.  
 The concentration and specialization required for client representation 
is learned in the clinic, not in substantive law lecture courses. It is now 
commonly accepted in the profession that the training in substantive, 
procedural, and evidentiary law that students receive in clinical courses 
instills a deep understanding of and competence in the law and practice 
that are the subjects of the clinic. Moreover, the knowledge and the 
practice techniques learned in the clinic are retained longer than those 
learned outside the experiential process.125 
 This issue raised little public comment. Eliminating specific 
prerequisite courses was questioned by the Bar Board of Governors126 but 
125. “Developments in philosophy and in learning sciences have made increasingly clear 
the reciprocal interpenetration of cognitive development and social interaction . . . . 
Skillful practice, whether of a surgeon, a judge, a teacher, a legal counselor, or a nurse, 
means involvement in situations that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view 
of formal knowledge. Professional practice, that is, depends on judgment in order to yield 
an outcome that can further the profession’s intended purposes.” SULLIVAN ET AL., supra 
note 103, at 8; see also STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75. 
126. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed 
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By 
Law Students) (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author).  
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only in relation to permitting non-Bar members to supervise students,127 
and by the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law which wanted 
to see specific details regarding the pre- and co-requisites before the 
change was made.128 Nonetheless, the judges and professors began by 
expressing their different perspectives on how prerequisite course 
requirements should factor into the updated rules. The ad-hoc committee 
understood that both clinical courses and the basic law school curriculum 
had changed significantly since the original rules were promulgated. 
However, the judges were not as familiar with the changes in academia. 
The law professors pointed out that prerequisite courses were not relevant 
to some clinics—especially non-litigation clinics—and that they prevented 
students from joining some clinics. The professors also stressed that clinic 
students learned the substantive law and procedure used in their cases 
more thoroughly in the clinic than in survey courses. The judges did not 
question the value of the changes in the academy but initially believed 
students would be better prepared if they took even more courses related 
to their clinic work before they began to represent clients. While 
acknowledging the validity of this assertion and the value in students’ 
training, the professors highlighted that law school is a time-limited 
experience. The professors understood the pedagogical notion of 
scaffolding as a way to improve a student’s understanding of the practice 
of law129—that when training is properly sequenced, learning is enhanced 
and embedded for future use. 
 At some point, the judges abandoned their resistance and agreed to 
eliminate mandatory course prerequisites from the student practice rule. 
Their willingness to try a new method for ensuring preparedness derived 
from the waivers of these course requirements they had granted in the 
past, from the realization that few other states required prerequisite 
courses prior to clinic enrollment, and from a clearer understanding of 
pedagogical methodology that supported the ad-hoc committee’s position. 
They also recognized that once they incorporated Rule 49’s broad 
definition of the “practice of law” into the student practice rules, the 
prerequisite courses would no longer be related to every kind of clinic.  
 The amended rules now require that law schools prescribe the 
necessary pre- and co-requisite requirements for each clinical course to 
ensure that students are prepared to represent people in the kinds of 
matters with which each clinic deals.130 The Court did not attempt to 
127. See infra note 195, for a discussion of the proposal to permit visiting faculty to 
supervise law students. 
128. Comments by Cynthia G. Wright, Chair, Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law, 3 (submitted March 6, 2014) (on file with the author). 
129. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Developing a Teacher Training Program for New Clinical 
Teachers, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 341 (2012). 
130. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2); see Appendix B. 
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select those courses but rather left it to the good judgment of the faculty to 
determine the appropriate courses. 
 
b. The Clients 
 
 The 1982 rule, like the original rule, allowed students to represent 
only “indigent” clients. There were two reasons for this limitation: The 
court did not wish to take fee-generating cases away from the practicing 
bar, and, more important, the Court and the Bar wanted to assist the 
hundreds of poor clients who needed representation but who were unable 
to retain paid counsel.131 The ad-hoc committee sought to expand 
representation by replacing the indigency restriction with a provision that 
would allow students to represent “under-served persons” and leave it to 
the good faith of the clinical directors to implement the rule. The ad-hoc 
committee believed that the indigency requirement had become too 
restrictive given the changing demographics of those in need of assistance 
and that student representation posed little danger to the profitability of the 
practicing bar. The ad-hoc committee also believed that the rules should 
specifically permit representation of non-profit organizations. Although 
the 1982 rules did not specifically preclude representation of non-profits 
or tenant coops, the ad-hoc committee felt that clarity would eliminate any 
ambiguity. 
 The ad-hoc committee advanced several arguments for expanding the 
client base. The goal of all the clinical programs in all the District of 
Columbia law schools is to provide legal services to under-represented 
people and public interest organizations. A definition of “the under-
represented” that is limited to indigent people is elusive because the term 
is subject to many interpretations. For example, the Access to Justice 
Commission defined a low-income family as a family of four earning 200 
percent of the federal poverty threshold or $42,201.132 The Commission 
noted that some organizations use 250 percent of the federal threshold as a 
standard.133 Though indigency thresholds are updated annually for 
inflation, they have remained otherwise unchanged for decades and may 
not accurately indicate who is truly poor. Indeed, while many routine 
expenses have become increasingly important, including childcare, health 
care, and transportation, their changing cost-values are not reflected in 
131. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), had established a constitutional right to 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants in 1963. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), had 
done the same for alleged juvenile delinquents. Although no similar constitutional right 
existed in 1967, unrepresented litigants were the staple of landlord-tenant court, small 
claims court, and domestic relations court. 
132. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 21. 
133. Id. at 19; see also id. at 21–28. 
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indigency calculations.134  
 The indigent litigants who still populate the civil courts have been 
joined by the near-indigent who, like their poor counterparts, cannot find 
lawyers to take their cases to court or represent them in matters not 
involving litigation.135 Clinic directors often turn away prospective clients 
they are not sure meet the indigency standard. The plight of the near-poor 
caused the Access to Justice Initiative to report that moderate-income 
individuals may have even less access to legal assistance than individuals 
in poverty.136 District of Columbia law school clinics have been ready to 
provide legal services, but the indigency limitation has prevented students 
from representing under-represented people who did not fall below the 
indigency threshold. Though people who need Earned Income Tax Credit 
assistance, people interested in micro-enterprise and small business, tenant 
groups seeking to form co-ops, dying people with small estates, and 
individuals seeking bankruptcy protection may or may not be technically 
indigent, they need legal assistance to participate fully in the American 
economy and the American legal system.137 Small claims cases, torts cases 
with small damages, and most tenant claims do not attract the private bar 
since litigation costs outweigh possible awards. Seekers of human rights 
protection often have some ability to pay, but the costs of pursuing their 
claims are usually prohibitive. Though some asylum-seekers are able to 
pay some amount for legal services, few private lawyers specialize in this 
field. The few public interest organizations and practicing lawyers that 
have the necessary expertise often refer clients to law school clinics 
because they themselves are unable to take on additional clients or 
because clinical faculty and their program staffs have developed greater 
expertise in these areas of law and practice. The clinics, however, have 
134. Id. at 19–20; see also JENNIFER COMEY, ET AL., EVERY KID COUNTS IN THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 15TH ANNUAL FACT BOOK 2008 19–20 (2008) (showing that 
while public preschool and kindergarten enrollment has increased steadily annually 
between the 2001–02 and the 2009–10 academic years, enrollment in federally funded 
Head Start programs increased during the last two years of that period after remaining 
stagnant since at least 2004). The American Poverty Act of 2008 would have required the 
Census Bureau to develop new measures of poverty, but the bill died in Committee. The 
American Poverty Act, H.R. 6941, 110th Cong. (2008). 
135. In 2005, nearly half of plaintiffs with probate matters before the DC Superior 
Court’s Probate Division were pro se. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 7, 129–34. 
“Almost all of the small estate matters (i.e., those involving assets of $40,000 or less) and 
the majority of the trust matters before” that tribunal had pro se plaintiffs. Id. Thirty-eight 
percent of plaintiffs were pro se in adoption cases. Id. Over ninety-eight percent of 
respondents were unrepresented in paternity and child support cases. Id. Ninety-eight 
percent of all litigants—petitioners and respondents—in the Domestic Violence Unit 
were pro se. Id. Only about three percent of defendants in the more than 46,000 cases 
heard in Landlord and Tenant Court in 2006 were represented by counsel. Id. 
136. Id. at 19. 
137. Id. at 21–28. 
 29 
                                                 
 
 
been reluctant to take on these clients because of uncertainty concerning 
the application of the indigency requirement to the prospective client. 
  There is great need for legal assistance among people who are not 
formally indigent, yet there are few practitioners able to take these 
cases.138 Given the volume of cases clinics actually take, little if any 
competition with private practitioners for revenue would occur if the clinic 
client base were expanded.139 Most states have not limited students to 
representing indigent clients: Student practice rules in only sixteen 
states140 limit representation to the indigent. Federal agency student 
practice rules seldom contain indigency requirements,141 and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit does not have 
an indigency requirement.142 Although the ad-hoc committee did not 
investigate the reasons many jurisdictions chose not to maintain income 
ceilings, it nevertheless believed that the District of Columbia citizenry’s 
needs were such that the D.C. student practice rules’ client qualification 
standards should be relaxed. Given the difficulty of using income-based 
guidelines, the proposed amendments sought to eliminate the indigency 
restriction entirely in order to increase the number of lawyers able to serve 
under-served populations in the District of Columbia. 
 Public comments supported expansion of the client base, but the 
judges were initially wary of broadening the rules to allow student 
representation of non-indigent clients. The judges correctly pointed out 
that there was no shortage of poor people needing legal assistance in the 
District of Columbia, and that the clinics were not wanting for clients. The 
judges wondered whether a specific allowance of representation for non-
profits would drive clinics away from their public service model. They 
wondered whether clinics would find interesting start-up companies more 
attractive than public interest organizations or even poor clients, and thus 
undermine rather than enhance access to justice. The courts had come to 
rely on students in many of their divisions and did not want to see their 
services diverted toward organizations that might start out small but 
blossom into mega-corporations.  
 Over time, the judges’ discomfort with allowing students to represent 
non-indigent people subsided. Perhaps the change was based on a 
138. “[T]he needs of those who cannot afford a lawyer substantially outweigh the 
available resources.” Id. at 10; see also id. at 43–82. 
139. See id. at 42. 
140. Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Kentucky permits representation of the indigent and of 
students irrespective of financial ability. Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research 
Guide, supra note 27. 
141. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1, 1292.1 (2014) (governing practice before the United 
States Immigration Court). 
142. Cf. D.C. App. R. 46 (2013). 
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realization that all the law schools built their clinics on a social-justice 
model, where those most in need of service were the ones who would 
receive representation, and that the clinics were unlikely to abandon that 
model. Perhaps the judges recognized that the Court’s own Access to 
Justice Commission sought more lawyers for the near-poor. The Court 
was also aware that many states had no indigency requirement.143 
Whatever the cause of the shift, the Court agreed to expand the rule 
beyond indigency, and to specifically include non-profit organizations as 
potential clients. The ad-hoc committee agreed to some limitation on 
eliminating the indigency restriction.  
 It took time to find language that encompassed both the ad-hoc 
committee’s and the judges’ thinking. The Court and the ad-hoc 
committee ultimately agreed that the revised rule should permit students to 
represent “any client who is indigent or who, because of limited financial 
ability or the nature of the claim, would be unlikely to obtain legal 
representation”144 and to leave it up to the good faith of law school faculty 
to implement the rule. The new rule would also specifically permit 
representation of any non-profit organization,145 eliminating the 
uncertainty engendered by the 1982 rule and again leaving it to faculty 
supervisors to select non-profit clients who could not otherwise find pro 
bono counsel. 
 
2. THE ADMISSIONS AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS:  CHARACTER SCREENING AND 
DEAN’S CERTIFICATION 
 
 Pursuant to the 1982 student practice rules, students seeking 
authorization to practice were required to submit to a character screening 
and be approved by the District of Columbia Committee on 
Admissions.146 The ad-hoc committee surveyed several state and federal 
student practice rules and found that the process the District of Columbia 
rules prescribed was far more cumbersome than what most states required. 
Although the screening process was not as extensive as that required for a 
lawyer applying for D.C. Bar membership, it did require time and effort 
by court administrators and law school faculty, administrators, and 
students. The ad-hoc committee believed that the process was redundant 
and could be minimized by relying on the character screening that law 
schools already undertook prior to students’ applying for permission to 
practice.  
 The 1982 rules required that a law school dean certify that a student 
was of “good character and competent legal ability” and “adequately 
143. See supra note 140 (listing the sixteen states that maintain indigency requirements). 
144. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1); see Appendix B. 
145. See D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1). 
146. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(1) (1982). 
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trained to participate in cases or matters pending before the courts or 
administrative tribunals.”147 In ascertaining good character, the clinic 
directors asked students a set of questions concerning prior arrests, school 
disciplinary actions, alcohol and drug use, debt, mental health, and litigant 
status148—questions provided by the Committee on Admissions.149 
Students who indicated that they had prior incidents concerning those 
activities were required to provide written explanations relating to those 
incidents, and official documents that confirmed their explanations. These 
students were then counseled by the faculty about their prior actions so 
that the dean could properly certify that each student was of good 
character. Such students were also reminded that they would have to 
collect this information again and answer with even more specificity to 
state bar committees on admissions when they applied for full membership 
as lawyers. Once a clinic director was satisfied that a student met the 
student practice rules’ character requirements, the director forwarded the 
student’s application to the dean, who certified the student’s good 
character.  
 The dean was also required to certify the student’s competency, and 
did so based on the student’s academic record.150 Then the application, the 
student’s answers to the questionnaire concerning arrests and other 
potentially disqualifying information, the accompanying documentation 
concerning those events, and the dean’s certificate of good standing were 
submitted to the Committee on Admissions. The Committee on 
Admissions reviewed a student’s application package in much the same 
way the clinic director had before the application was submitted. The 
Committee staff occasionally requested additional information but 
conducted no independent investigation beyond reviewing what the 
applicant had submitted. 
 No student in recent memory has been denied a student certification 
once the documentation was provided.151 Thus, the ad-hoc committee 
believed that requiring a second investigation after a law school dean has 
147. D.C. App. R. 48(b) (1982). 
148. See Appendix C infra for the questions asked by the Committee on Admissions. 
149. Today’s students may have many more notations on their records for minor arrests 
and for school disciplinary actions than prior students had because of high school and 
college zero-tolerance policies. These incidents, which usually occur well before entry 
into law school, do not result in a denial of admission to the regular bar, but they can 
cause delays in students’ certifications while documentation is collected from students’ 
home states. Students’ minor behavioral lapses are not different from those of their 
predecessors. What has changed is society’s response to those minor behavioral lapses. 
Notwithstanding this phenomenon, no student has been denied admission to practice 
because of such minor transgressions. 
150. Some, but not all, schools had minimum grade requirements for student 
participation.  
151. See supra notes 93, 95. 
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certified a student’s good character, using the same information, created 
unnecessary administrative burdens and costs to the Committee on 
Admissions and to the clinic faculty who had to organize and transmit the 
material. Students were disadvantaged because their work in the clinic and 
their educational experiences were often delayed while students gathered 
the necessary information and awaited decisions from the Committee on 
Admissions. This problem was especially true in Spring-semester 
clinics.152  
 The ad-hoc committee noted that the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit did not require character screening by 
a Bar or Court Committee on Admissions: It delegated the certification of 
good character to the law school dean,153 as did most federal courts.154 
Maryland and Virginia had minimal requirements: Applicants must be 
familiar with state Rules of Procedure and Professional Conduct, and law 
school deans must certify the students’ good character and academic 
standing.155  
 The ad-hoc committee found that only a few states required students 
to be formally screened by the Bar to obtain a limited license to practice. 
A search of the state student practice rules and conversations with clinic 
directors at other law schools156 indicated that most states required only a 
familiarity with the rules and a certification by the dean as to character. 
Only Florida by its rules required a formal character screening of all 
students seeking a certification to practice.157 Missouri rules required 
screening for those students who also were pre-applying to the Missouri 
Bar,158 but no formal screening for other student applicants. Alabama 
required a formal character screening by virtue of an interpretation of the 
student practice rule,159 and West Virginia160 prohibited practice by 
152. First-semester students usually gather the information during the summer. 
153. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(3)(D) (2013). 
154. See, e.g., 4th Cir. Local Rule 46(a) (2013); 3d Cir. Local Rule 46.3 (2011); 2d Cir. 
Local Rule 46.1(e)(3) (2012).  
155. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MD. R. 16 (1990); RULES OF THE 
SUP. CT. OF VA., PART SIX, § IV, ¶ 15 (2009). Maryland conducts no actual student 
screening. Once a clinical program is certified, all future students are admitted upon 
certification from the Dean. E-mail from Professor Eric Easton, Chair of the Maryland 
State Bar Association’s Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, to 
Professor Wallace Mlyniec, Professor Georgetown University Law Center (Sept. 8, 2009) 
(on file with the author). 
156. Results of a discussion thread on the Clinical Legal Education Listserv among 
clinical professors, conducted between January 26, 2009, and January 31, 2009, on file 
with the author. 
157. Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar ch. 11, R. 11–1.3(a) (2014). 
158. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 13.02. 
159. E-mail from Robert R. Kuehn, Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Skills 
Programs, University of Alabama School of Law, to Professor Wallace Mlyniec, 
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students who had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude or a felony 
and by students who had been subjected to an honor code violation. All 
other states required only a dean’s certification.  
 Requiring that lawyers and students be of good character is important 
to preserving public confidence in the profession; but the District of 
Columbia law schools’ procedures advance that goal much more 
efficiently and productively than can screening by the Committee on 
Admissions. For learning purposes, it makes sense for certification and 
counseling functions to be performed by law school faculty rather than by 
the Committee on Admissions. The student practice rules place ultimate 
responsibility for students’ actions on supervising attorneys.161 
Supervisors are also responsible for their subordinates’ actions by virtue of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.162 Finally, the dean163 and the Court164 
may revoke a student’s license at any time if reason to do so becomes 
apparent.  
 While in school, students are in the process of learning the law and the 
norms and values of the profession. Clinic directors’ conversations with 
students about character rules and professional norms and values impress 
upon the students the need for and the importance of maintaining high 
standards within the profession. Further, understanding their obligations 
and responsibilities in the context of the actual practice of law helps 
students to better understand the role of a lawyer in the legal system. 
Formally enforcing character rules too strictly or too early prevents 
students from enrolling in a clinic and from being exposed to the 
professionalism they need prior to applying to the Bar. Ironically, students 
most in need of professional socialization are sometimes deprived of those 
lessons because a clinic director believes it will take too long to assemble 
the written documentation for the Committee on Admissions.   
The ad-hoc committee believed that it made sense to leave the certification 
process within the schools and eliminate the Committee on Admissions’ 
redundant and time-consuming processes. Experiences in other states and 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
demonstrated that screening and certification by a dean was sufficient to 
guarantee the high standards the Court, the Bar, and the public required.  
 Only the D.C. Court of Appeals Committee on the Unauthorized 
Practice of Law objected to streamlining the character review and 
Professor Georgetown University Law Center (January 25, 2009) (on file with the 
author). 
160. W. VA. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW R. 10.1(c) (1989). 
161. D.C. App. R. 48(e)(2). 
162. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1. (2007). 
163. D.C. App. R. 48(c)(1)(ii). 
164. D.C. App. R. 48(c)(1)(iii). 
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application processes.165 They believed that entrusting the task to the 
deans created an “inherent tension between the law school dean’s 
responsibility to undertake this obligation and the understandable desire to 
include as many students as possible in an approved clinical program”166 
and that the dean would not have sufficient time to devote to this task.167 
Notwithstanding these objections, the ad-hoc committee’s proposal on this 
matter met with no resistance from the judges. The Committee on 
Admissions acknowledged that its processes for character screening 
resembled those the law schools used, and the judges agreed that 
redundancy was unnecessary. The final rule requires that a student “be 
certified by the dean of his law school as being of good character and 
competent legal ability and as being adequately trained to engage in the 
limited practice of law as defined by these rules.”168 
 
3. FEES FOR SERVICES 
 
a. Student Stipends 
 
 Since 1968, it was understood that students should be educated, not 
enriched, by clinical practice; students were to receive neither fees from 
clients nor compensation from the court’s budget for representing indigent 
defendants in criminal cases.169 The ad-hoc committee understood that 
students’ lives and financial constraints had changed dramatically since 
1968. The ad-hoc committee also knew that students who completed a 
clinical program often worked on clinic cases after they completed the 
clinic course but could receive neither credit (by virtue of most law school 
rules) nor payment (by virtue of court rules). Additionally, the ad-hoc 
committee knew that students who completed the formal requirements of a 
clinical program often wished to continue representing clinic clients under 
supervision as volunteers or for additional credit or financial assistance 
from their law schools. Some students who had graduated wished to 
continue representing clients during the summer while they studied for bar 
examinations. They were able to do so pursuant to the existing student 
rules because an authorization to practice as a student usually expires in 
July and can be extended until the student is either admitted to a state bar 
165. Comments by Cynthia G. Wright on Proposed Amendments to District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By Law Students), Chair, Committee on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law (submitted March 6, 2014) (on file with the author). 
166. Id. at 2. 
167. Id. 
168. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(3); Appendix B. 
169. D.C. Code §11-2604 (2001), the Criminal Justice Act, permits payments to lawyers 
for representing indigent criminal defendants but D.C. Superior Court Rules prohibit the 
payment of such funds to students. Cf. D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44-I(f)(2)(A). 
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or denied such admission.170 The rules of the District of Columbia 
Superior Court171 and the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit also authorize students to continue representing their 
clinic clients after the students have completed a clinic course.172  
 Students asked by clinic faculty to continue with their duties are often 
unable to do so without some remuneration. Clearly, the 1982 District of 
Columbia student practice rules did not and could not prohibit paying 
students who acted as law clerks on cases for their clinic supervisors. 
There was uncertainty, however, about whether students could be paid if 
they were acting as student lawyers pursuant to their certifications after 
they had completed their clinic courses. The rules could be read to prohibit 
students from receiving a student research or other like stipend from a law 
school while working on clinic cases during the summer or during the 
school year after completing a clinic course, because the student’s 
authority to practice stemmed from a license granted pursuant to the 
student practice rules.173 As a result, faculty members were wary of asking 
students to continue to work on their cases after they completed their 
clinic courses. The ad-hoc committee believed that the rules should be 
amended so that students could receive a research stipend or other similar 
grant if they continued to work on clinic cases after they completed their 
clinic courses. 
 The ad-hoc committee’s research found that the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit specifically permits law 
schools to pay students for their work on clinic cases.174 In addition, 
twenty-five states specifically permit the supervising entity to pay students 
for their work in a clinic,175 and an additional twenty-one states do not 
prohibit such payments.176 The ad-hoc committee saw no reason to 
prohibit students from being paid by the law school for work on clinic 
cases after completing their clinical courses, so long as they were paid a 
typical student research stipend or with a grant paying a similar amount. 
170. See D.C. App. R. 48(c)(1)(i). 
171. See D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44-I(f)(2)(A). 
172. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(3)(C) (2013). 
173. Surprisingly, the existing rules allowed students to receive salaries as employees of 
the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Public Defender Service while 
representing litigants, although these three entities no longer paid students who 
participated in a law school clinic. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(6) (1982). 
174. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(4). 
175. See Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27 (including the 
following states: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington). 
176. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. 
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The ad-hoc committee proposed that the rule be amended to allow such 
payments. 
 There was no public comment about this issue. The Court was initially 
reluctant to authorize payments to students, based on the philosophical 
notion that clinic work was pro bono work. The judges also worried that 
payments for post-course work on clinic cases might be unregulated or 
resemble the kinds of payments students received from law firms for 
summer work. The law professors pointed out that students could already 
be paid for all sorts of work on a case, so long as they acted as clerks 
rather than as student attorneys. The ad-hoc committee assured the Court 
that money used for student stipends would come from pro bono 
fellowship organizations or from the schools in amounts no higher than 
those received by law school professors’ research assistants. The 
professors also reminded the Court that many other states did not restrict 
such payments.177 In the end, the Court agreed. The language the Court 
ultimately chose reads, “[p]ayment of a student research stipend or other 
law school based support, or a similar grant to a law student or a recent 
graduate who continues to work on clinic cases after the completion of the 
clinical course shall not make that student ineligible to practice under this 
rule.”178 
 
b. Fees to Clinical Programs 
 
 The 1982 version of the District of Columbia student practice rules 
was silent on the issue of the payment of fees to clinical programs, but 
most clinical faculty assumed that law school clinics could not receive 
fees.179  Despite the absence of authority in the Court of Appeals Rules, 
177. Id. 
178. See D.C. App. R. 48(b)(5). 
179. This created an interesting anomaly. If a clinic initiated a civil suit on behalf of a 
client where the law professor was the attorney of record and students assisted as law 
clerks and not certified law students, the clinic could obtain fees for the time that the 
professors and the students spent working on the case. See Jackson v. Brown, 614 N.E.2d 
847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (awarding attorneys’ fees for student work); Jordan v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 691 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that fees award could include 
payment to law school clinic even though students were unlicensed and even though 
students themselves did not receive payment, and that reduction based on alleged 
duplicative claims could not preclude payment to clinic entirely); see also Center for 
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 696 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Ustrak v. 
Fairman, 851 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1988) (reducing attorney’s fees award where excessive 
time was billed at several steps of the litigation, including time for law student to review 
Court of Appeals rules). But see Nkihtaqmikon v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 727 F. Supp. 
2d 91 (D. Me. 2007) (refusing to grant fees for clinicians’ work because billed attorneys’ 
hours were sufficient to complete necessary work); Brown v. Iowa, 152 F.R.D.168, 176 
(S.D. Iowa 1993) (adjusting over-estimated attorneys’ fees, including student hours, to 
reflect time reasonable lawyer should have spent); Weaver v. New York City Emp’rs Ret. 
 37 
                                                 
 
 
 
clinical programs had been permitted since 1982 to receive fees, costs, and 
penalties prescribed by law in civil actions in the District of Columbia 
Superior Court, so long as the original indigency eligibility requirements 
were enforced.180 That provision recognized that judgments, statutes, or 
settlements in civil cases often required the payment of lawyers’ fees. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also 
specifically permitted law school clinics to receive fees for their work.181 
 Clinical programs are expensive. Law schools expend millions of 
dollars from their operating budgets on clinical education. In the early 
years of clinical education, some of those costs were borne by foundation 
grants, but for the most part those grants are no longer available. Law 
schools must cover the costs of clinical education with tuition funds, and 
tuitions spiral higher every year. Because of the low student to faculty 
ratio in most clinics, the cost per student is generally higher than he cost 
per student in a typical lecture class. 
 As noted in the Access to Justice Commission’s report, many low-
income and moderate-income clients cannot find lawyers because they 
cannot cover the entire cost of a lawyer’s fee or because the outcome of a 
contingency fee case will be too low or is too uncertain. The ad-hoc 
committee believed that if the rules were amended to permit clinics to 
receive fees below market rate or on a contingency basis, clinics could 
assist more clients, including people with small damage contingency cases 
and those who could pay a partial fee and also help defray the cost of the 
clinical program. The ad-hoc committee also believed that the Superior 
Court’s rule concerning statutory and/or court-ordered fees and sanctions 
should be included in the Court of Appeals student practice rules to 
forestall challenges by adverse parties. Because there are not enough 
lawyers to meet the needs of low-income or moderate-income clients, such 
a change would not result in clinics taking clients from the practicing bar.  
 Most states’ rules on fees and payment are less restrictive than the 
District of Columbia’s 1982 rule on the matter. Twenty-five states 
specifically permit students’ supervising entities to receive fees from 
clients,182 and an additional twenty-one states do not prohibit the 
practice.183 The ad-hoc committee believed the experiences in other states, 
Sys., No. 88 Civ. 2662, 1991 WL 24320, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991) (awarding fees 
for students’ work but adjusting amount). But see Wilkins v. Sha’ste, Inc., No. 99167 
2013 WL 4138210, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 2013-
1794 (Ohio March 12, 2014) (declining to award fees for legal interns’ work where 
litigant was never under any obligation to pay). 
180. D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 101(e)(1)(A). 
181. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(4). 
182. Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27. 
183. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
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in the District of Columbia Superior Court, and in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit demonstrated the value of 
authorizing the collection of statutory and other fees and sanctions 
provided by law. The ad-hoc committee believed that specifically 
permitting clinics to receive certain fees and sanctions would enable 
clinical programs to provide representation to additional low- and 
moderate-income clients and non-profit organizations whose needs were 
not being met by market-rate attorneys. Thus the ad-hoc committee sought 
a clear rule that permitted clinics to accept reasonable fees as long as 
client income restrictions were met. 
 There was no public comment on this issue. For reasons not unlike 
those that underlay its initial concerns about student stipends, the Court 
was reluctant to approve an amendment allowing clinics to receive fees. 
Moreover, the Court believed that law schools should support their own 
clinics, and saw rising tuition as proof they could.184 The ad-hoc 
committee could not convince the Court to allow clinics to receive below-
market fees from clients who could pay something. Nonetheless, the 
parties reached an agreeable compromise, and the following language was 
adopted: “Nothing in this rule shall prevent a law school clinic from 
receiving court-ordered or statutory fees or court-ordered sanctions related 
to a case or legal matter.”185 We left the larger issues about below-market 
fees from clients for another day. 
 
4. SUPERVISOR QUALIFICATIONS 
 
 Law schools, like other parts of universities, have a tradition of 
inviting professors from other schools to visit on their faculties for one or 
two semesters. Although non-clinical faculty easily accommodate visiting 
and new faculty appointments, such accommodations are more 
complicated for clinical faculty. Unlike visiting non-clinical faculty, new 
and visiting clinical faculty members must not only be active scholars and 
accomplished teachers but also active and competent practitioners.186 
 New and visiting clinical faculty members from other states are 
seldom members of the D.C. Bar. However, the 1982 student practice 
rules required that supervising faculty members in clinics be active 
members of the District of Columbia Bar and provided no exemption from 
this requirement. This prohibition was somewhat surprising since the 
184. The ad-hoc committee declined to engage in a complicated debate about law school 
finances and pointed out that clinics were often the least well-funded recipients of law 
school revenues.  
185. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(5); Appendix B. 
186. Since clinical education has become an accepted part of the academy, clinic faculty 
members have gained enhanced professional status, security, and governance rights and 
frequently are required to be productive scholars as well as able teacher-supervisors.  
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District of Columbia allows lawyers who are members of other state bars 
but not members of the District of Columbia Bar to practice and appear in 
court pro hac vice187 or while providing pro bono legal services.188 There 
is no history to explain why the original rule permitted only D.C. Bar 
members to be supervisors; but as the Board of Governors of the D.C. Bar 
argued, the differences between the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is a basis for precluding 
non-D.C. Bar members from being supervisors.189  
 The student practice rules’ faculty-restriction made appointing visiting 
faculty in clinics complicated. Faculty visits are sometimes arranged 
quickly because of an emergency. Visiting faculty members are sometimes 
invited from other law schools for one or two years in order to test a 
proposed new clinic, to provide release time for a clinic supervisor who is 
attending to research or other administrative duties, or to be considered for 
a permanent appointment. Although law schools usually pay the fees for a 
professor’s bar admission, the delays inherent in the application process 
often render a professor’s visit impossible or delay a visitor’s ability to 
supervise students. Even if a visit can be arranged enough in advance to 
permit supervision immediately upon the visitor’s arrival, many visiting 
faculty do not want to go through the lengthy process of submitting the 
D.C. Bar application and others simply do not want to maintain multiple 
bar memberships. 
 Law schools, including those in the District of Columbia, have 
expanded their clinical faculties to lower their student-faculty ratios and to 
staff the increasing number of seminars and small classes that are now 
prominent features of legal education. Appointing new faculty is 
somewhat less complicated than appointing visiting faculty but can have 
equally undesirable pitfalls. New faculty members are usually appointed in 
the late spring preceding their initial year of teaching at the new school. 
They often come from non-District of Columbia law schools, and 
accordingly are members of other state bars. New faculty members 
immediately apply to become members of the District of Columbia Bar, 
but the process is lengthy and often incomplete before the school year 
commences.190 As a result, new faculty often cannot supervise students 
until their second or third semester in residence, and schools are forced to 
bring in short-term visiting faculty who are members of the D.C. Bar to 
187. D.C. App. R. 49(c)(7). 
188. D.C. App. R. 49(c)(9). 
189. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed 
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By 
Law Students) (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author). Related concerns 
were voiced by the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Comments by 
Cynthia G. Wright, Chair, Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (submitted 
March 6, 2014) (on file with the author). 
190. See D.C. Code §11-2501 (2001). 
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supervise students. If no local supervisor is available, the students, who 
enrolled in the course months before, are unable to represent clients.191  
 Other states’ rules concerning clinic supervisors are more liberal than 
those of the District of Columbia. At least twenty-three states permit law 
professors who are members of another state’s bar to supervise law 
students in a clinical program. Seventeen states have specific rules that 
allow special bar admission for law professors who are teaching in law 
school clinical courses.192 The ad-hoc committee was aware of six 
additional states that allow law professors from other states to supervise 
students pursuant to a more general rule that allows non-state bar members 
to represent clients requiring pro bono assistance.193  
 The District of Columbia Bar permits members of other state bars to 
practice pro bono for two years and to practice pro hac vice without being 
members of the District of Columbia Bar.194 Given the experiences in 
other states and the D.C. Bar’s liberal treatment of non-D.C. lawyers in 
other circumstances, the ad-hoc committee proposed amendments that 
would allow new faculty to supervise students while their applications for 
membership in the D.C. Bar were pending and allow visiting faculty to 
supervise upon quickly receiving a waiver of the default rule from the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The ad-hoc committee believed 
that this procedure would satisfy the Court’s and the Bar’s concerns about 
the knowledge and quality of supervisors and satisfy the law schools’ 
academic needs and policies.195 
191. Usually a new faculty member is hired because there was no one else on the District 
of Columbia law school faculty able to assume the duties of the clinic. Non-clinical 
faculties are often unable to fill in because they are not members of the D.C. Bar or 
because they have no, or at least no recent, practice experience. In other cases, a school’s 
clinical faculty is not in a position to take on additional responsibilities. 
192. Arkansas, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 
27. 
193. In addition to the seventeen states that permit law professors to run clinics without 
being Bar members, an additional fourteen states permit non-Bar members who are not 
clinical professors to represent indigent clients. They are Alaska, Delaware, Florida, 
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia. We have been advised that at 
least Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia 
consider clinics public interest organizations and permit out of state lawyers to supervise. 
Id. 
194. Comment to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(7) (citing Brookens v. Committee on Unauthorized 
Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1988)). 
195. Based on the authors’ personal knowledge, permitting non-D.C. Bar members to 
supervise would require amending not only the student practice rules but also District of 
Columbia Bar Rule XI concerning disciplinary proceedings to make new and visiting 
faculty members who supervise students’ cases subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and its Board on Professional Responsibility. 
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 Neither the judges nor the Board of Governors of the District of 
Columbia Bar were comfortable with this proposed amendment. The 
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law had similar reservations. 
Although the judges recognized the asymmetry between Rule 48’s 
requirements for supervisors and Rule 49’s provisions for pro bono and 
pro hac practice, they saw reasons to expect more from lawyers who 
supervised students. They also believed that the District of Columbia had 
enough qualified lawyers to fill visiting professor appointments.196 The 
The Court of Appeals amended Bar Rule XI when they amended Rule 48. Court of 
Appeals Amends Rule Governing Legal Assistance by Law Students, Jurisdiction, D.C. 
BAR (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.dcbar.org/about-the-bar/news/rule-48.cfm. 
196. This statement is partially true. The District of Columbia has an ample supply of 
qualified lawyers. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between supervising 
lawyers in practice and supervising students in a clinic. The goals of the two are different 
and the pedagogy of clinical education is highly sophisticated and requires a considerable 
amount of experience to master. See generally Wallace J. Mlyniec, Where to Begin: 
Training New Clinical Teachers in the Art of Clinical Pedagogy, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 
505 (2012). D.C. Superior Court Judge Todd Edelman, former training director at the 
District of Columbia Public Defender Service and a former Visiting Professor of Law at 
Georgetown, described the differences this way:  
 
The way I look at it, the goals of a criminal clinic supervisor are to teach 
the students some things about the role of a lawyer, trial practice, 
relationships with clients, the substantive law, and ethics, to provide a 
public service, and to help students determine their suitability for this kind 
of work. Those goals control, at least in a rough way, the model of 
supervision. For the most part, the students do not view the work of the 
clinic as their life’s work, and a good portion of my supervision (not only 
at the beginning of the year, but throughout the academic year) consisted 
of motivating the students by focusing them on the mission and 
importance of the work and on the academic mission of the clinic. While 
the goal of the clinic was to teach by allowing the students to do as much 
as possible on the case, there was always an understanding that the 
supervisor was ultimately responsible for each case and client. Finally, 
because the point of the clinic is to provide an outstanding academic 
experience, caseloads are kept low, and reflections on (and even criticisms 
of) the models of representation are encouraged.  In a public defender or 
legal services office, the ultimate goal of the supervisor is to provide new 
attorneys the tools to succeed on their own.  Given the large caseloads of 
line attorneys and the heavy responsibilities of the supervisors, as well as 
the fact that the cases are the responsibility of the line attorney rather than 
the supervisor, the type of intensive supervision of every aspect of the case 
that should be the norm in a clinic cannot be and should not be the 
supervision model in a public defender or legal services office. While the 
supervision in a professional office is thus, less exhaustive and intensive, it 
is aimed at improving higher-tiered skills. There is less space and need for 
discussions of the overall value and ethics of the work.  The supervision 
focuses on broad questions concerning strategy and case theory, on fine-
tuning trial preparation, and on the use of advanced trial techniques.  It 
does not focus on the day-to-day management or the preparation of the 
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Bar was especially resistant, believing “there are risks in entrusting such 
responsibility to individuals who do not have the relevant practice 
experience in the District of Columbia and who are unfamiliar with the 
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct and District of Columbia practice.”197 
The Board noted that the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct differed 
from the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct in significant ways, and 
feared that visiting professors would not know the differences.198 The 
case. Nor does the supervision focus on the larger systemic and societal 
questions that arise in the case, or on the personal development of the 
lawyer. 
 
Quoted in Wallace J. Mlyniec, Developing a Teacher Training Program For New 
Clinical Teachers, 19 CLINICAL. L. REV. 327 (2012). It also misconceives the nature of 
modern law faculties in which academic credentials are at least equally if not more 
important than being a successful practitioner.  
197. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed 
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By 
Students), 3 (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author). 
198. Id. at 3–4. The Board of Governors noted that “Under the D.C. Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“D.C. Rules”) and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“ABA Model Rules” or “Model Rules”), the basic duties of competence, 
diligence, loyalty, and protection of client information are substantially the same. 
However, although some former differences were narrowed as a result of relatively recent 
amendments to both the D.C. Rules and the ABA Model Rules, the D.C. Rules may still 
vary more from the Model Rules than other jurisdictions that have adopted the Model 
Rules format. In some instances, the D.C. Rules are more specific, for example, in 
addressing the application of particular rules to government lawyers. In other instances, 
the D.C. Rules are more general, for example, in addressing trial-related publicity in Rule 
3.6. Some differences are substantive. Noteworthy differences between the D.C. Rules 
and the ABA Model Rules include, but are not limited to, the differences in the rules on 
written retainer agreements; confidentiality of information- both the scope of the duty and 
a lawyer’s limited ability to use or reveal Rule 1.6 protected information pursuant to 
narrowly defined exceptions; written waivers requirements; paying or guaranteeing client 
expenses; imputation of conflicts of interests; a lawyer's ability to report out Rule 1.6 
information when a lawyer represents an organization; safekeeping of property; 
withdrawal; prospective clients; candor to tribunal; inadvertent production of privileged 
documents; nonlawyer partners; solicitation; choice of law; and nondiscrimination. One 
area in which the D.C. Rules vary significantly from the ABA Model Rules (and those 
jurisdictions that follow the ABA Model Rules) is on Rule 3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal). 
A specific example where a supervising lawyer unfamiliar with the D.C. Rules might 
resolve an ethical dilemma incorrectly would be in a civil matter in which a clinic law 
student discovered that a client’s statement/s of material fact were patently false and as a 
result, the student's statement/s to a tribunal about a material fact or facts were also false. 
The proper course of conduct would be to discuss and persuade the client to correct the 
record, or to allow the student to do so. If the client refused to correct the record or to 
allow the student to do so, the only proper course of conduct would be for the student to 
seek to withdraw (pursuant to D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16) without alerting 
the tribunal as to the reason for withdrawal except under a very narrow exception. This is 
because the reason for withdrawal is itself protected by Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality). In 
contrast, a lawyer resolving this question under the rules of a jurisdiction that had 
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Board felt that given the short terms of their stays, visiting faculty 
members would not be invested in learning those differences.199 The 
Board also questioned whether the “high standard of supervision [could] 
be maintained if the requirement of active D.C. Bar membership [were] 
eliminated”200 and worried that the students might be put at risk of ethical 
violations based on non-D.C. Bar member supervisors’ misinterpretations 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. These fears assume that visiting 
faculty members would immediately begin to supervise without 
preparation and training to ensure that they understood key aspects of 
District of Columbia law and practice. Such fears are of course, without 
substance.  
 Despite these initial disagreements and the Board of Governors’ 
reservations, the judges and the ad-hoc committee looked for ways to 
accommodate all the interests involved. A compromise solution was 
derived from comments by the Bar’s Board of Governors. In its 
comments, the Board speculated that the Court might be willing to allow 
new and visiting professors to supervise without being members of the 
D.C. Bar and suggested a series of conditions it believed would satisfy the 
Board’s concerns and protect the public. The Governors proposed that 
faculty members who were not members of the D.C. Bar should, like those 
non-D.C. Bar members practicing pursuant to Rule 49, be members in 
good standing of a state bar, have not ever been disbarred or suspended for 
disciplinary reasons, and have not resigned membership in any state with 
such charges pending.201 The Governors suggested that non- D.C. Bar 
member faculty supervisors be supervised by a member of the District of 
Columbia Bar202 and that they, like all new members of the D. C. Bar, be 
required to successfully complete a course on ethics and practice 
conducted by the Bar.203 The judges and the ad-hoc committee accepted 
these suggestions. The amended rules allow a practitioner who joins a 
District law school’s permanent clinical faculty to supervise students if he 
or she is an active member in good standing of the highest court of any 
adopted ABA Model Rule 3.3 would have an entirely different ethical duty. Under ABA 
Model Rule 3.3, the lawyer would be required to tell the tribunal of the material 
misrepresentation, even if the client directed the student to stay silent. In the District of 
Columbia, however, the lawyer's disclosure to the tribunal in most circumstances would 
be a violation of D.C. Rule. 
199. Id. at 3–6. 
200. Id. at 3. The Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law had similar 
reservations. Comments submitted by Cynthia G. Wright, Chair, Committee on the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 2 (submitted March 6, 2014) (on file with the author). 
201. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed 
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By 
Students), 7 (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author). 
202. Id.  
203. Id. at 8–10. 
 44 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
state, has not been sanctioned by any state bar or be pending disciplinary 
proceedings, and has applied to the D.C. Bar within ninety days after 
assuming his faculty position. Such a faculty member must be supervised 
by an enrolled, active member of the Bar who is employed by the law 
school, must be subject to D.C. Bar rules, and must cease supervising 
students if his bar application is denied.204 Similarly, a visiting faculty 
member must seek a waiver of the student rule’s default provision 
regarding supervisors rather than seek admission to the D.C. Bar and meet 
the other conditions that apply to new faculty members. They must also 
complete the Mandatory Course on the District of Columbia Rules of 
Professional Conduct and District of Columbia Practice required for new 
admittees to the District of Columbia Bar.205  
 
C. ISSUES ARISING FROM PUBLIC COMMENTS 
 
 Two issues that deviated from the ad-hoc committee’s proposed 
amendments arose during the public comment period. The first concerned 
the role that the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) would have 
in promulgating rules for students who appear before District of Columbia 
agencies. The OAH’s Chief Administrative Law Judge noted that the 
OAH had promulgated its own rules concerning student practice206 and 
argued that it should be allowed to continue to do so. Second, some 
members of the District of Columbia pro bono bar suggested that the 
proposed amendments did not go far enough and that student practice in 
pro bono matters should be decoupled from what they perceived to be 
unnecessarily restrictive rules concerning clinics. The ad-hoc committee 
opposed both suggestions based on pedagogical and client concerns. 
 
1.  THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 
 
 The Chief Administrative Law Judge noted that the Office of 
Administrative Hearings had promulgated its own student practice rules 
that reflected the needs of the clients who appeared before OAH hearing 
panels and the procedures used by its tribunals.207 Although Rule 48 
specifically covered practice before administrative tribunals,208 the Chief 
Judge and some clinical teachers believed that Rule 49 created an 
exemption for lawyers and other persons practicing before D.C. agency 
tribunals209 and that the exemption was applicable to law students as 
204. See D.C. App. R. 48(e)(4)(i). 
205. See D.C. App. R. 48(e)(4)(ii). 
206. 1 D.C.M.R. §§ 2833.4–2833.6. 
207. See id. 
208. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(4). 
209. 1 D.C.M.R. § 2833.1, citing D.C. App. R. 49(c)(1), (4), (8), and (9). 
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well.210 Moreover, as several commenters noted and as the ad-hoc 
committee and the Court recognized, non-D.C. lawyers and even non-
lawyers are permitted by law to represent people in many of the cases 
brought before the agencies.211 Therefore, they asserted, no law or policy 
prohibits law students from providing representation in similar kinds of 
cases. 
The ad-hoc committee recognized that Rules 48 and 49 seemed to 
contradict each other, but it believed that Rule 49 was written for bar-
admitted lawyers, not students who were regulated by Rule 48. The ad-hoc 
committee also noted that the OAH student rules were less stringent than 
Rule 48, in that they allowed students to practice law in administrative 
tribunals without participating in any formal training, completing pre- or 
co-requisite courses, or having received a certification of good character 
and legal competence. In addition, Rule 49 provided no academic 
standards for supervising lawyers other than that they be members of the 
D.C. Bar.212  
 Because the ad-hoc committee believed that students were bound by 
Rule 48, it believed that students, at least those who appeared in cases 
where lawyers were required, should be governed by Rule 48. The OAH 
believed it needed students to help the hundreds of poor litigants who 
came before its tribunals, and argued in its public comments that it had the 
authority pursuant to Rule 49 to create its own rules. The ad-hoc 
committee recognized these concerns but believed the OAH position 
invited a poor educational experience and could put clients at risk. 
 
2. THE POSITION OF THE PRO BONO BAR 
 
 The pro bono organizations, through their public comments, did not 
object to an expansion of the student practice rules. Instead, many of the 
public commenters believed that the proposed rules were too restrictive 
and that pro bono organizations should be able to make more use of 
students with fewer restrictions. Pro bono organizations pointed to a long 
history of D.C. law students participating in pro bono work, performing 
tasks similar to those students have performed in private law firms and 
public interest organizations for years. Neither the 1982 student practice 
rules nor the proposed amendments sought to affect this activity because 
210. Comments of the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings on 
Proposed Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Student 
Practice), submitted by Mary Oates Walker, Chief Administrative Law Judge, dated 
December 31, 2013 (on file with the author). 
211. See, e.g., Digital Broadcast Corp. v. Rosenman & Colin, LLP, 847 A.2d 384, 389 
(D.C. Ct. App. 2004); Rood v. LaPrade, 444 A.2d 950, 952 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“There 
is no prohibition in the rules of the Superior Court against an appearance pro hac vice by 
an attorney whose firm has an office in the District of Columbia.”). 
212. 1 D.C.M.R. §§ 2833.4–2833.6. 
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students working with pro bono organizations were not giving legal advice 
or independently signing documents, and thus were not “practicing law” 
under Rule 49.213 When students assist lawyers with pro bono cases, only 
the lawyers bear responsibility for the legal matters.  
 The pro bono organizations wanted more, asking the Court to allow 
students to practice under the supervision of a pro bono organization 
lawyer without complying with the rigorous requirements that 
accompanied practice as part of clinical education courses.214  The ad-hoc 
committee feared that allowing students to practice without the formal 
training clinics provide would create serious risks for clients and provide 
poor education for the students. 
 
D.     BASES FOR THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE’S OPPOSITION 
 
1. EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE: MERGING THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
 The clinical legal education model was developed to broaden legal 
education and to equip students with the legal practice skills they cannot 
obtain from the textbook-based theoretical coursework.215 Though 
opinions vary as to which practical skills are most essential,216 clinical 
legal education has generally sought to supplement the doctrinal 
foundation and analytical skills the Langdell core curriculum ostensibly 
213. The American Bar Association does authorize such programs but sees them as 
providing a much different experience from what an in-house clinic provides. See ABA 
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 18. When such 
programs are affiliated with law schools, they are generally referred to as externships. 
The language of the ABA Accreditation Standard does not contemplate actual client 
representation.  
214. See, e.g., Comments of the D.C. Bar Section on the Courts, Lawyers & the 
Administration of Justice (not those of the D.C. Bar or of its Board of Governors) by 
Fritz Mulhauser, Co-Chair, (submitted January 24, 2014); Comments of the D.C. 
Consortium of Legal Service Providers, by Chinh Q. Le, Legal Director, Legal Aid 
Society of the District of Columbia & Tina S. Nelson, Managing Attorney, Legal Counsel 
for the Elderly (submitted January 29, 2014) (on file with the author). 
215. See, e.g., Karen Tokarz et al., Legal Education at a Crossroads: Innovation, 
Integration, and Pluralism Required!, 43 J.L. & POL’Y 11, 14 (2013); Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
612, 613 (1984). 
216. One common view looks to provide education that develops what the Carnegie 
Report has described as the three professional apprenticeships: “(1) teaching doctrine and 
analysis, which provides the basis for professional growth, (2) introducing facets of 
lawyering practice, which leads to acting with responsibility for clients; and (3) 
inculcating professional identity, values, and dispositions of the legal profession, which 
fosters ethical practice.” Tokarz et al., supra note 215, at 36 (citing WILLIAM W. 
SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUC. 
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 194 (2007)). See also AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, supra note 102. 
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supplies.217 The Association of American Law Schools and the American 
Bar Association have envisioned clinical education as providing 
instruction in everything from interviewing and fact-gathering to 
developing case strategy to counseling clients to negotiating and settling 
and trying cases—including developing methods for assessing one’s own 
professional performance.218  
 Essential to the central function of clinical education is the merger of 
theory and practice and the reflection219 upon that merger, which in turn 
creates a process for lifetime learning. A student’s ability to perform a 
skill adequately does not create mastery of the skill. The student must 
learn the skill as an outgrowth of its underlying theory to truly “master” it. 
Students should also learn to transfer the knowledge gained from the 
mastery of one skill to a different skill that was not the subject of the 
original action. For example, it is not especially difficult to teach students 
how to perform the mechanics of a direct or cross examination—but 
excellent education relates those skills to case theory, other skills 
employed prior to and during a trial, and the doctrinal law that supports 
and controls the exercise of those skills.  Teaching a skill in isolation, 
without teaching its natural relationship to other skills needed to protect a 
client’s interest creates an underdeveloped understanding of that skill. 
Such learning takes place in clinics on a daily basis. It does not in most 
non-clinic experiential courses. 
 The spectrum of school-sanctioned experiential learning models now 
includes simulation courses, in-house clinics, field placement programs, 
and hybrid models of teaching and learning.220 Although the goals of each 
differ, each provides a form of academic inquiry that is missing from that 
provided in a pure pro bono placement. In an in-house clinic, professors 
217. See Anahid Gharakhanian, ABA Standard 305’s “Guided Reflections”: A Perfect Fit 
for Guided Fieldwork, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 61, 80 (2007) (citing motivating third-year 
students as a benefit of experiential learning). 
218. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH. & AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON GUIDELINES FOR 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC., CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, 14–15 (1980) [hereinafter 
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION]; see also ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 17–18 (304(b) and 305). 
219. “Reflective practice is the integration of intentional thought and specific action 
within a professional context.” Timothy Casey, Reflective Practice in Legal Education: 
The Stages of Reflection, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 317, 322 (2014); see also citations within. 
220. See Elliott S. Milstein, Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House 
Clinics, Externships, and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375, 376 (2001) (describing 
the three models). There is, of course, variation among programs within each of these 
categories. See, e.g., Neil Kibble, Reflection and Supervision in Clinical Legal 
Education: Do Work Placements have a Role in Clinical Legal Education, 5 INT'L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 83 (1998) (describing two types of field placement programs: the 
“enhanced” model, which includes a reflection element such as a seminar, and the “pure” 
model, which does not include such a component). 
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have great control over the curriculum, but students are not always 
exposed to the full scope of the non-legal challenges associated with 
ongoing practice. In externships, where students to work with pro bono 
organizations that provide a high level of academic intervention, students 
see a broad range of law practice issues but seldom participate in all facets 
of a case and supervision and critique are not as intense as they are in an 
in-house clinic. Although summer employment, internships, and programs 
proposed by the pro bono bar and the OAH are increasingly seen as 
essential items on students’ résumés,221 they do not and cannot provide 
students with the academic structure needed to acquire the kinds of 
knowledge and reflective learning222 that effective and ethical practice 
requires.223 That can only occur in an academically-based program. Non-
academic pro bono activities are really on the job training experiences 
without academic inquiry. 
 In-house clinics rely on the union of academic insight and real cases 
to maximize student learning. As academics, clinicians aim to expose 
students to elements of lawyering that are likely to be difficult to observe 
in practice, such as case planning, theory development, and strategic 
decision-making, because students seldom spend enough time with the pro 
bono organization to participate in all facets of a case. Simultaneously, 
and unlike non-academic pro bono placements, clinics place responsibility 
for clients’ cases directly with students, enabling them to understand, in 
the role of a lawyer, what it means to make complex decisions on 
another’s behalf.224 Implementation of the proposals from OAH and the 
pro bono bar would decouple the theoretical and analytical training that is 
221. See James H. Backman, Where Do Externships Fit? A New Paradigm Is Needed: 
Marshaling Law School Resources to Provide an Externship for Every Student, 56 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 615 (2006); AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, supra note 102, at 270–71 
(1992). 
222. “Reflective practice is the integration of intentional thought and specific action 
within a professional context.” Casey, supra note 219, at 322; see also citations within.  
223. See, e.g., Tokarz et al., supra note 215, at 40 (“Students need the guidance of faculty 
and repetition with increasing levels of complexity and variations of context, in order to 
master the skills and develop the habits of reflective practice that are essential to the 
professional identity of lawyers.”); see also Posting of Mary Lynch, 
mlync@albanylaw.edu, to lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Mar. 17, 2010) (on file 
with author) (“The legal education reform movement underscored that only integrated, 
well supervised, well designed opportunities provide the structure for sustained 
development of professional judgment and professional identity.”); Posting of Kenneth 
Kowalski, Kenneth.Kowalski@law.csuohio.edu to lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu 
(Mar. 18, 2010) (on file with author) (acknowledging the value of field placement 
programs especially where students cannot participate in in-house clinics, but asserting 
that “in almost every instance a student will learn more about how to effectively and 
ethically practice law in a clinic than in any other course”). 
224. Posting of Wallace Mlyniec, mlyniec@law.georgetown.edu to lawclinic-
bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with author). 
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provided during the clinical experience through faculty guidance from the 
practical tasks of client representation.  
 The distinctions between the in-house clinic model and pro bono 
student programs are clear in terms of the type and quality of learning the 
program provides and the that role law school resources play in helping 
students achieve such learning.225 Both models purport to develop 
professionalism through modeling and mentorship. Proponents of non-
academic programs note that they are more flexible than law school 
programs both in terms of students’ abilities to craft programs that fit their 
needs and shape their own learning by choosing placements they desire 
and by devising for themselves how to learn on the job.226 However, it is 
not clear that pro bono field placements can reliably deliver the effective 
supervision that educators uniformly believe is the essential element of 
success under any model.227 
Professor Vanessa Merton has noted how dramatically experiential 
legal education can change when it is conducted without academic 
supervision.228 Her observations about the differences between clinical 
supervision and extra-scholastic supervision raise serious concerns about 
the degree to which experiential learning outside the clinical structure can 
prepare students for practice, and about the quality of service advocates in 
such programs provide clients. Partly in response to the New York Bar’s 
pro bono requirement, lawyers in that state created mass pro bono 
programs to address indigent communities’ legal needs, especially in the 
wake of natural disasters. Merton proposes that these “justice incubators,” 
which are staffed by independent but affiliated law school graduates with 
some law school-provided supervision, can provide quality client service 
225. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 218, at 14–17. 
226. See, e.g., James H. Backman, Externships and New Lawyer Mentoring: The Role the 
Practicing Lawyer is Filling in Educating Lawyers, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 65, 77 (2009); 
Backman, supra note 221. 
227. See generally, e.g., KAY KAVANAGH & PAULA NAILON, EXCELLENCE IN THE 
WORKPLACE: LEGAL SKILLS AND LIFE SKILLS (2007).  See Tokarz et al., supra note 215, 
at 40; STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75. See also LIZ RYAN COLE & LEAH WORTHAM, 
Learning from Supervision, in LEARNING FROM PRACTICE: A PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT TEXT FOR LEGAL EXTERNS 44–15 (J.P. Ogilvy, Leah Wortham & Lisa G. 
Lerman eds., 2007). Cole identifies three characteristics of effective feedback: (1) non-
judgmental comments that offer specific examples of how the extern can improve, (2) 
conversations that include (a) questions (from the supervisor to the supervisee) designed 
to help the supervisor understand how and why the student arrived at the process she used 
to complete the assignment and (b) alternatives to that process, and (3) specific 
instruction on “how things should be done in the future.” Id. 
228. VANESSA MERTON, PRACTICE IN EXTREMIS: SUPERVISION AND QUALITY CONTROL 
(April 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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but that the kind of supervision students receive in incubators provide 
differs from supervision provided for the same tasks in formal clinics.229 
 In the in-house clinic, faculty supervisors meet frequently and 
regularly with individuals and case teams in seminars, supervision 
sessions, and case rounds230 to transmit their knowledge and advice about 
relationships between theory and practice. They simulate tasks, maintain 
high-quality legal research and lawyering resources, and supplement broad 
guidance with specific feedback. Merton observed that under field-based 
models, supervisors may conduct one or two mass training sessions but 
otherwise rely on the distribution of standardized materials and referrals to 
websites and listservs to disseminate information. In such programs, errors 
may be corrected directly at the request of individual participants, but 
individual feedback is rare.231 Although the programs Merton studied are 
not exactly like those proposed by the D.C. pro bono bar, her research is 
nonetheless instructive. 
 In the in-house clinic, training begins with fundamental theory and 
emphasizes skills development and cultural competence in relation to that 
theory. Simulation and individualized instruction tracks student 
improvement, which can take “as long as it takes.” Non-academic 
supervisors, however, typically provide legal instruction and tips to help 
participants complete specific tasks that are in need of immediate attention 
and action. Clinics employ self- and peer- evaluation to supplement formal 
assessment (e.g. grades, recommendations, and certifications), but limits 
on time and personnel usually prevent non-academic supervisors from 
doing much assessment at all.232 
 In clinics, teachers can address the complex intricacies of legal 
practice the moment they arise. They have maximal control over their 
students’ assignments and are afforded maximal time and resources to 
guide students’ decisions and help them review their experiences. In short, 
traditional clinicians have greater resources and greater autonomy than 
even very good lawyers in programs where supervision is based outside 
the school. As a result, students are likely to receive better education 
through in-house clinics even when excellent supervising lawyers run 
229. See also Laurie Morin & Susan Waysdorf, The Service-Learning Model in the Law 
School Curriculum, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2012) (proposing a hybrid clinic 
that employs service work and a theoretical classroom component, which was tested 
during the response to Hurricane Katrina). 
230. Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A Signature Pedagogy for Clinical 
Education, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2007). 
231. MERTON, supra note 228. 
232. Id. But see Natalie Gomez-Velez, Structured Discrete Task Representation to Bridge 
the Justice Gap: CUNY Law School’s Launchpad for Justice in Partnership with Courts 
and Communities, 16 CUNY L. REV. 21, 33 (2013) (describing an alternative, 
longitudinal approach to social justice apprenticeship). 
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alternative programs.233 
 Though scholars have devoted much effort to describing methods by 
which students can make the most of the often meager supplies of 
supervision available in their field placements and how mentors can be 
trained to provide good feedback and guidance,234 little has been recorded 
to suggest that students themselves are dissatisfied with the feedback they 
receive in either academic or non-academic experiential learning settings 
where feedback is scarce. In one study, Professor Harriet Katz investigated 
the results of a survey that asked students how frequently they 
encountered modeling, feedback, collaboration, supervision, and 
nondirective supervision in academic externship placements and how 
often they learned from their own reflection. Katz found that students 
emphasized global themes like motivation and immersion in the practice 
setting, but not supervision methods, when they described their “best 
learning experiences.” She also noted that students valued supervision 
methods more highly the more frequently they were exposed to those 
methods.235  
 As far as we know, no such surveys have been conducted for purely 
pro bono placements but it is probably safe to say that students would 
answer the same way. Practitioners assigned to supervise students in non-
academic experiential placements are often ill-equipped to provide the 
guidance students need to effectively take charge of their own 
education.236 Some legal professionals who supervise externs receive 
formal training about effective supervision techniques from the legal 
employer administering the externship237 or from the law school, but 
many do not. Those who do not may fail to provide effective supervision 
for a myriad of reasons: They may incorrectly assume students already 
have the skills required to complete a task, or they may doubt their own 
abilities to teach the required skills. They may think giving complete 
feedback is too time-consuming, or they may incorrectly believe that 
providing examples of good work (e.g. legal writing) is sufficient to 
impart the information and skills students need to succeed. Supervisors 
may not know how to address differences between their own teaching 
233. MERTON, supra note 228. 
234. See, e.g., Liz Ryan Cole, Training the Mentor: Improving the Ability of Legal 
Experts to Teach Students and New Lawyers, 19. N.M. L. REV. 163 (1989); KAVANAGH 
& NAILON, supra note 227. 
235. Harriet N. Katz, Reconsidering Collaboration and Modeling: Enriching Clinical 
Pedagogy, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 315, 331 (2005–2006) (study of best externship supervision 
practices). 
236. See COLE & WORTHAM, supra note 227; see also Bernadette T. Feeley, Training 
Field Supervisors to Be Efficient and Effective Critics of Student Writing, 15 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 211, 215–16 (2009) (suggesting that practitioners may doubt their own abilities to 
teach effective legal writing). 
237. Cole, supra note 234. 
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styles and students’ learning styles. Supervisors may view feedback as 
criticism and be reluctant to offer feedback for fear of offending or 
embarrassing students.238 This is not to say that they are bad lawyers and 
there is no doubt many are inspirational for students. Notwithstanding, 
they cannot provide the kind of supervision a student receives in an 
academic clinic.  
Students seeking effective feedback may have to overcome supervisors’ 
preconceptions about the process, like the common belief that supervision 
is tantamount to “spoon-feeding” and therefore at best, a waste of time and 
at worst likely to interfere with the supervisor’s responsibilities to 
clients.239 There is no doubt students will learn something when 
participating in non-academic pro bono field placements detached from 
the clinical model; however, what they learn will be limited in comparison 
to what they would learn in a law school clinic, and it will most likely be 
task-related rather than integrated with complex theory and analysis. 
 
2.  PRO BONO SUPERVISION: THE PROBLEM OF INEFFICIENCY 
 
Liz Ryan Cole describes three types of supervisor-student 
relationships outside an in-house clinic: (1) the ideal relationship, wherein 
the student understands his assignment and quickly and independently 
produces a product the supervisor is happy with; (2) a bad relationship, 
wherein the student produces a good product but only with excessive 
hand-holding and the supervisor is left wondering whether the work would 
have been done quicker and better had he done it himself; and (3) the 
nadiral relationship, in which the student does not understand the 
assignment and turns in unacceptable work, leaving the supervisor closer 
to his deadline but with nothing to show for his educational efforts. In 
their zeal to avoid scenarios (2) and (3), Cole suggests, “many lawyers 
avoid supervision as much as they can.”240 Unfortunately, students in non-
academic experiential programs are unlikely to experience the ideal 
relationship. 
 Supervision types two and three are hardly ever the product of 
negligence; they merely reflect the realities of legal service organizations. 
How supervisors perceive their responsibilities is critical to the 
educational value of an experiential learning program because, as one 
clinician put it, “[a non-academic placement’s] value very much depends 
238. Feeley, supra note 236. 
239. Id. 
240. Id.; see also Henry Rose, Legal Externships: Can They Be Valuable Clinical 
Experiences for Law Students, 12 NOVA L. REV. 95, 96 (1987) (suggesting that field 
supervisors have little incentive to meet law schools’ educational goals). But see Janet 
Motley, Self-Directed Learning and the Out-of-House Placement, 19 N.M. L. REV. 211 
(1989) (expressing willingness to assume there are practitioners who will make good 
teachers and role models). 
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on the commitment of the placement to the student as opposed to only . . . 
the work to be accomplished by the student.”241 Because a supervising 
attorney’s workload can rarely be adjusted to accommodate his 
educational responsibilities when a student is assigned to him through a 
field placement, pedagogical concerns sometimes necessarily come second 
to other demands on the supervisor’s time, resulting in sub-optimal 
educational opportunities for the student. Students’ skills at completing in-
demand tasks become more valuable than their developing good 
independent judgment, and there is little time for exploration of larger 
questions of justice that unite theory, practice, and ideals.242 Because 
clinicians must be both advocates and educators, an in-house clinician 
may be able to represent five to seven clients in the time it takes him to 
represent one with a student. If a non-academic supervisor were to try to 
do everything a clinical teacher does, student placements would make the 
office less efficient. If I am correct about my five- or seven-to-one ratio, 
every student reduces a public interest lawyer’s client base by four to six 
clients. The demand for representation by poor people is too great for that 
kind of choice. The mission of legal services providers—to serve the 
poor—would suffer.243 Therefore, educating students must be a secondary 
goal for pro bono organizations. In contrast, academic clinics hold both 
educational and advocacy missions. They achieve these dual goals by 
maintaining small caseloads—a luxury non-academic supervisors do not 
have.   
 It is not even clear that non-academic placements fulfill the goal of 
providing students with the invaluable exposure to real-life lawyering. 
Because of clients’ demands, non-academic programs often fail to expose 
students to the breadth of tasks that full-time practice requires.244 Pro bono 
placements often give students little contact with the full range of actors 
they will encounter in licensed practice, actors such as clients, witnesses, 
judges, and opposing counsel.245 Because the assignments are task-based, 
the experience sometimes produces myopic views about cases and legal 
241. Posting of Kenneth Kowalski, Kenneth.Kowalski@law.csuohio.edu to lawclinic-
bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with the author). 
242. Posting of Wallace Mlyniec, mlyniec@law.georgetown.edu to lawclinic-
bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with author). 
243. “[S]upervising attorneys may be less likely than those at school-based clinics to risk 
compromising client service for the purpose of student experience; after all, the agency 
purpose is defined by service to their clients, not by education of the students they accept 
as volunteers.” Katz, supra note 235, at 328. 
244. See Posting of Jay Pottenger, j.pottenger@yale.edu to lawclinic-
bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with the author) (advocating for 
hybrid clinics but “students who are not really the one exercising primary professional 
responsibility for the client . . . are deprived of myriad opportunities to notice, analyze, 
and make choices and decisions”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
245. Rose, supra note 240. 
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issues, with the result that—contrary to the founding purposes of 
experiential legal education—students have little opportunity to apply the 
theory they have learned in the classroom.246 This limited exposure to the 
scope of real-world legal practice may be attributable to misalignment 
between supervisors’ purposes and law school’s objectives. Although law 
schools prioritize students’ experience and education, field supervisors are 
often more concerned with gaining assistance with heavy workloads.247 
Many scholars—especially those who are skeptical about the mounting 
popularity of experiential learning centered outside the traditional clinic—
hold that “learning how to learn” is perhaps the best skill a student can 
acquire through any experience-based course of study;248 however, 
feedback often falters when law students’ work is seen as a tool to manage 
the practical demands of a caseload.249 
 
3. CLIENT CONCERNS 
 
 Requests by the pro bono bar and the OAH to use students outside the 
clinical education context rely on the assumption that clients will be well 
served by such representation. Two arguments support this assumption: 
The first is that there is a great need for student representation because 
there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. The second is that 
in cases where the law permits lay representation, a law student is 
preferable to a representative with no legal training. Both of these 
arguments rely on the premise that a student is better than no one. There is 
a great need for more attorneys to represent the poor, but to say that 
untrained or marginally trained students can do the job implicitly makes 
246. Id. Students who participate in field placement programs often review their 
experiences in group discussions guided by on-campus faculty. This method of 
supplementing non-academic supervision may be necessary given field supervisors’ 
understandable reliance on giving students task-centered work, but it is insufficient to 
meet the educational imperatives of experiential legal education. Especially during the 
era surrounding the start of the clinical legal education movement, the Langdell method 
was critiqued on the basis that it relies on parsing appellate cases without sufficient 
concern for the human interactions, judgments, and decisions that underlay them and that 
these exercises are guided by teachers who themselves are detached from practice.  
Educators concerned by departures from the in-house clinic model point out that a 
clinical teacher who does not personally guide students’ cases and projects runs the same 
risks casebook professors run: teaching in the abstract, to the detriment of the students’ 
theoretical and practical learning. Posting of Wallace Mlyniec, 
mlyniec@law.georgetown.edu to lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 
2010) (on file with author). 
247. Rose, supra note 240. 
248. Tokarz et al., supra note 215, at 41 (quoting EDWARD CELL, LEARNING TO LEARN 
FROM EXPERIENCE ix (1984)) (“[T]he greatest justification of an experiential component 
in formal education [is] not in the content of what is learned from those experiences but 
in what is learned about the process of learning from any experience.”). 
249. See Cole, supra note 234, at 168-69. 
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an unacceptable statement about poor people: that the poor can do with 
less than the rich.  
 Acceptance of the pro bono bar and the OAH’s proposals demands a 
belief in the assumption that students’ performance and supervisors’ 
guidance will always be sufficient to provide adequate service to clients. 
Accepting that premise requires a great leap of faith. Some members of 
the pro bono bar hoped law schools would provide the requisite training,  
but schools are unlikely to spend their training dollars outside of in-house 
programs unless they jettison quality to save money. Moreover, it is 
unclear who would guarantee that the students and supervisors will 
actually provide good service if the clinical model is abrogated. 
 Ethical pitfalls are inherent when supervision and training are lax. 
This is evident already where lawyers who represent the poor do little to 
improve their skills.250 Untrained supervisors may fail to instruct students 
in law, skills, and ethics, leading students to inadvertently engage in 
unethical or unskilled practices when their activities go unchecked. 251 
This is not to say such behavior is intentional or even to say that it would 
become common. It is sufficient to say that the checks on student practice 
that exist in law school-based clinical education are likely to reduce 
unethical and unsatisfactory results. No such checks regularly exist in non-
academic programs. 
 
E. THE COURT’S RESPONSE 
 
 In the end, the Court did not address the pro bono organizations’ 
suggestions. The judges saw the issues raised by the pro bono bar as 
outside the scope of the rule they were considering but saw the 
modification of the student practice rules as a first step in a longer 
conversation about the access to justice. Thus, they left the resolution of 
the pro bono bar’s issues for another day. The Court did, however, permit 
the OAH to fashion its own rules.252 That decision was based on the fact 
that non-lawyers may provide representation in many agency cases and 
because the Court of Appeals Judges believed that the OAH, as an agency 
of government, can be trusted to write and administer its own rules. 
Whether the OAG seeks to strengthen its somewhat permissive rules to 
ensure adequate training and supervision also requires further 
consultation.  
250. See, e.g., Vanita Gupta & Ezekiel Edwards, Too Many Still Wait to Hear Gideon's 
Trumpet, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (March 18, 2013, 11:38 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/too-many-still-wait-hear-gideons-
trumpet; John A. Lentine, Gideon at Fifty: The Broken Promise, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
375–91 (2013). 
251. See Nancy M. Maurer & Robert F. Seibel, Addressing Problems of Power and 
Supervision in Field Placements, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 145 (2010). 
252. See D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1)(iii). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Courts, the Bar, and law schools all share responsibility for training 
students to become effective and ethical lawyers. That process, however, 
is not static. It remains contextual, changing as the practice of law changes 
and as teaching methods become more sophisticated. A main instrument in 
advancing a student’s education is a student practice rule that reflects 
contemporary practice and the best practices in legal education. When a 
student practice rule no longer reflects contemporary practice or 
innovations in teaching, the rule must be changed.  
 The new District of Columbia student practice rule accommodates the 
needs and concerns of clients, courts, the bar, and the law schools. The 
process we used demonstrates how several law schools, controlled and 
somewhat constrained by the same court rule, can collaborate to develop 
strategies that meet their academic needs, and then work with a court and 
state bar to implement a rule that not only addresses academic needs but 
further the interests of the legal profession, expands access to legal 
services for low income people, and ensures that clients receive excellent 
representation for their claims. Both the legal academy and the legal 
profession in the District of Columbia have derived benefits from working 
together to amend the student practice rule and will benefit from the 
substance of the amendments. None of this, however, could have been 
accomplished without the leadership of the D.C. Court of Appeals and the 
judges of its Rules Committee. 
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APPENDIX A 
District of Columbia Student Practice Rule 
1982 Version 
 
RULE 48 
 
LEGAL ASSISTANCE BY LAW STUDENTS 
 
 
a. PRACTICE 
 
1. An eligible law student may engage in the limited 
practice of law in the District of Columbia in connection 
with any civil case or matter (including any family and/or 
juvenile proceedings) and any criminal case or matter (not 
involving a felony) which may be pending in any court or 
any administrative tribunal of the District of Columbia, 
which by rule of such court or tribunal permits such 
appearance as a part of a “clinical program,” as hereinafter 
defined, on behalf of any indigent person who has 
consented in writing to that appearance, provided that a 
“supervising lawyer,” as hereinafter defined, has also 
indicated in writing approval of that appearance. 
 
2. An eligible law student may also appear in any 
criminal case or matter on behalf of the United States or the 
District of Columbia with the written approval of the 
United States Attorney or the Corporation Counsel or their 
authorized representatives and the “supervising lawyer.” 
 
3. In each case the written consent and approval 
referred to above shall be filed in the record of the case. 
 
4. A “clinical program” for which such practice by an 
eligible law student is limited is a law school program for 
credit, held under the direction of a faculty member of such 
law school, in which a law student obtains practical 
experience in the operation of the District of Columbia 
legal system by participating in cases and matters pending 
before the courts or administrative tribunals. 
 
b. REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS. 
 
To be eligible to make an appearance pursuant to this Rule, the law 
student must: 
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1. Be enrolled in a law school approved by the 
American Bar association and the Admissions Committee 
of this court. 
 
2. Have successfully completed legal studies 
amounting to at least 41 semester hours, or the equivalent if 
the school is on some basis other than a semester basis, 
including evidence and criminal and civil procedure. 
  
 3. Be certified by the dean of the law school as being of good 
character and  
  competent legal ability, and as being adequately trained to 
participate in cases or  
  matters pending before the courts or administrative tribunals. 
 
4. Be certified by the Admissions Committee of this 
court as eligible to engage in the limited practice of law 
authorized by this Rule. 
 
5. Be registered with the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Committee of this court. 
 
6. Neither ask for nor receive a fee of any kind for any 
services provided under this rule, except that the payment 
of a regular salary to a law student who is also an employee 
of the United States or any agency thereof, the District of 
Columbia or any agency thereof, or the Public Defender 
Service shall not make that student ineligible under this 
rule. 
 
7. Certify in writing that the student has read and is 
familiar with the rules of the curt governing the Bar of the 
District of Columbia, including the American Bar 
Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility which 
pursuant to Rule X and Amendment A thereof, constitutes 
the standard governing the practice of law in the District of 
Columbia. 
 
c. CERTIFICATION 
 
The certification of a student by the law school dean: 
 
1. Shall be filed with the Clerk of the court and, unless 
it is sooner withdrawn, it shall remain in effect until the 
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expiration of one year after it is filed, or until the 
announcement of the results of the first bar examination 
given by the Admissions Committee of the this court 
following the student’s graduation, whichever is earlier.  
The certification may be continued in effect for any student 
who passes that examination until the student is either 
admitted by this court or denied admission to the Bar by the 
Admissions Committee. 
 
2. May be withdrawn by the dean at any time by 
mailing a notice to that effect to the Clerk.  It is not 
necessary that the notice state the cause for withdrawal. 
 
3. May be terminated by this court at any time without 
notice or hearing and without any showing of cause.  
Notice of the termination shall be filed with the Clerk and a 
copy thereof sent to the law school dean of the particular 
student. 
 
d. OTHER ACTIVITIES. 
 
1. In addition to participating in pending cases and 
matters as provided in section (a)(1) of this Rule, an 
eligible student may engage in other activities of the 
“clinical program” under the general supervision, but 
outside the physical presence, of the supervising lawyer, 
including: 
 
i. Preparation of pleadings and other 
documents to be filed in any case or matter in which 
the student is eligible to participate, but such 
material must be signed by the supervising lawyer. 
 
ii. Preparation of briefs, abstracts and other 
documents to be filed in appellate courts of this 
jurisdiction, but such material must be signed by the 
supervising lawyer. 
 
iii. Each pleading, brief, or other document 
must contain the name of the eligible law student 
who has participated in drafting it.  If the student 
participated in drafting only a portion of it, that fact 
may be mentioned. 
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2. An eligible law student may participate in oral 
argument in this court in the presence of the supervising 
lawyer in any appeal, including felony and misdemeanor 
cases, provided that there is filed with the Clerk a written 
consent from the appellant to that appearance and the 
supervising lawyer indicates in writing approval of that 
appearance. 
 
e. SUPERVISION. 
 
The “supervising lawyer” referred to in this Rule shall: 
 
1. Be a lawyer whose service as a supervising lawyer 
for the clinical program is approved by the dean of the law 
school in which the law student is enrolled. 
 
2. Assume full responsibility for guiding the student’s 
work in any pending case or matter or other activity I 
which the student participates and for supervising the 
quality of that student’s work. 
 
3. Assist the student in preparation of the case, to the 
extent necessary in the supervising lawyer’s professional 
judgment to insure that the student’s participation is 
effective on behalf of the indigent person represented. 
 
4. Be an “active” member of the District of Columbia 
Bar as set forth in the rules of this court governing the Bar 
of the District of Columbia. 
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APPENDIX B 
District of Columbia Student Practice Rule 
2014 Version 
 
RULE 48 
 
LEGAL ASSISTANCE BY LAW STUDENTS 
 
 (a) Practice. 
 (1) Pursuant to these rules and as part of a 
clinical program, an eligible law student may engage in the 
limited practice of law in the District of Columbia.  For 
purposes of applying this rule, the practice of law shall 
have the same meaning as it has in D.C. App. R. 49, which 
defines the unauthorized practice of law.  Nevertheless, an 
eligible student shall not represent a client in any adult 
criminal case involving a felony in the Superior Court of 
the District of Columbia.  This prohibition on practice in 
felony cases shall not apply to parole revocation hearings 
or prison disciplinary actions or to appeals before the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.  If the 
representation occurs before the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia, the Office of Administrative 
Hearings, or an agency of the District of Columbia, the law 
student must also comply with the rules of that court, 
agency, or tribunal with respect to student practice. After 
complying with the certification requirements of this rule, 
an eligible law student may also engage in the limited 
practice of law pursuant to the rules of any court, agency, 
or tribunal of another state of the United States, an 
international tribunal, or a court or agency of another 
country which by rule of such court, agency, or tribunal 
permits such appearance as part of a clinical program.  This 
rule does not govern practice before courts, departments, or 
agencies of the United States which, by rule or regulation, 
permit practice by law students.  Students practicing 
pursuant to these rules in a clinical program, as hereinafter 
defined, may represent any client who is indigent or who, 
because of limited financial ability or the nature of the 
claim, would be unlikely to obtain legal representation, or 
any non-profit organization, if the client or non-profit 
organization has consented in writing to that appearance or 
representation. A “supervising lawyer,” as hereinafter 
defined or defined by the relevant non-District of Columbia 
tribunal, must indicate in writing an approval of the 
 62 
 
 
student’s appearance or representation. 
(i) When appearing in any court or agency of 
the United States or another state of the United 
States, an international tribunal, or a court or agency 
of another country, law students and their 
supervisors shall be bound by the rules of that 
tribunal governing eligibility to practice and 
standards of practice and by the ethical rules of that 
tribunal or by the District of Columbia Rules of 
Professional Conduct pursuant to Rule 8.5.  
(ii) Students practicing pursuant to this rule 
must give prominent notice in all business 
documents of the students' status and that their 
practice is limited to matters related to the District 
of Columbia or other state, federal, or foreign court 
or agency that permits their participation. 
(iii)  The Office of Administrative Hearings and 
agencies of the District of Columbia may adopt 
rules governing student practice.  If their rules 
permit, a student may practice before those agencies 
and tribunals without being enrolled in a clinical 
program, provided that the student meets the 
requirements of D.C. App. R. 49(c) (5).  
 (2) An eligible law student may also appear in 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in any 
criminal case not involving a felony and, irrespective of the 
nature of the crime, any appeal in the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, any parole revocation or prison 
disciplinary action, or civil, family, or juvenile matter on 
behalf of the United States or the District of Columbia with 
the written approval of the United States Attorney or the 
Attorney General for the District of Columbia or their 
authorized representatives and the “supervising lawyer.” 
 (3) In accordance with D.C. App. R. 49, the 
“limited practice of law” described in section (a) (1) 
includes the following so long as the actions are guided by 
a supervising lawyer as defined by these rules or the rules 
of the tribunal in which representation is provided: 
(i) Preparing any legal document, including any 
deeds, mortgages, assignments, discharges, leases, 
trust instruments or any other instruments intended 
to affect interests in real or personal property, wills, 
codicils, instruments intended to affect the 
disposition of property of decedents= estates, and 
other instruments intended to affect or secure legal 
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rights; 
(ii) Preparing or expressing legal opinions; 
(iii) Appearing before any tribunal that permits 
student practice; 
(iv) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings 
of any kind, or any written documents containing 
legal argument or interpretation of law, for filing in 
any court, administrative agency or other tribunal 
that permits student practice; 
(v) Providing advice or counsel as to how any 
of the activities described in sub-paragraph (A) 
through (D) might be done, and whether they were 
done, in accordance with applicable law. 
 (4) In each case the written consent and 
approval referred to in (a) (1) and (a) (2) shall be filed in 
the record of the case. If representation does not entail a 
court appearance, such consent shall be part of any retainer 
agreement entered into by the client. 
 (5) A “clinical program” is a law school 
program for credit, held under the direction of a faculty 
member of such law school, in which a law student obtains 
practical experience in the practice of law or in the 
operation of the District of Columbia legal system by 
participating in cases and matters pending before the courts 
or administrative tribunals., or by otherwise providing legal 
services to clients with regard to legal issues. 
 
(b) Requirements and Limitations. 
To be eligible to engage in the practice of law pursuant to this Rule, the 
law student must: 
(1) Be enrolled in a District of Columbia law school 
approved by the American Bar Association and the 
Admissions Committee of this Court, and be enrolled in a 
clinical course at such law school. A supervised student 
need not be so enrolled if that student has satisfactorily 
completed a clinical course in a District of Columbia law 
school and is either still in law school or working for the 
clinic in the summer after graduation and is continuing to 
represent clients of the clinical program.  Notice of an 
extension to continue practice under this rule must be sent 
by the Dean to the Committee on Admissions. Such 
extension may be permitted only once and may remain in 
effect for six months. 
(2) Have successfully completed one-third of his or her 
legal studies. Law schools shall establish appropriate pre- 
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and co-requisite instruction to ensure that students are 
prepared to provide legal representation to clients. 
(3) Be certified by the dean of the law school as being 
of good character and competent legal ability, and as being 
adequately trained to engage in the limited practice of law 
as defined by these rules. 
    (4)       Be registered with the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee of this Court. 
(5)      Neither ask for nor receive a fee of any kind for any 
services provided under this rule from any client. Payment of 
a student research stipend or other law school based support, 
or a similar grant to a law student or a recent graduate who 
continues to work on clinic cases after the completion of the 
clinical course shall not make that student ineligible to 
practice under this rule.  Nothing in this rule shall prevent a 
law school clinic from receiving court-ordered or statutory 
fees or court-ordered sanctions related to a case or legal 
matter.   
(6)    Certify in writing that the student has read and is familiar 
with the District of Columbia Student Practice Rule (D.C. 
App. R. 48), the District of Columbia Unauthorized Practice 
Rule (D.C. App. R. 49), and the District of Columbia Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  
 
   (c)     Certification. 
(1)       A certification of a student by the law school dean: 
(i)     Shall be filed with the Committee on Admissions 
and, unless it is sooner withdrawn, it shall remain in 
effect until the expiration of one year after it is filed, or 
until the announcement of the results of the first bar 
examination given by the Admissions Committee of 
this Court following the student’s graduation, 
whichever is earlier. The certification may be continued 
in effect for any student who passes that examination 
until the student is either admitted by this court or 
denied admission to the Bar by the Admissions 
Committee. The certification may also be extended one 
time for six months if the supervised student has 
satisfactorily completed a clinical course and is either 
still in law school or working for the clinic during the 
summer, and is continuing to represent clients of a 
clinical program.  
(ii)     May be withdrawn by the dean at any time by 
mailing a notice to that effect to the Committee on 
Admissions. It is not necessary that the notice state the 
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cause for withdrawal. 
(iii)     May be terminated by this court at any time 
without notice or hearing and without any showing of 
cause. Notice of the termination shall be filed with the 
Committee on Admissions and a copy thereof sent to 
the law school dean of the particular student. 
(iv)   Once the certification is delivered to the court, the 
student shall be registered with the Unauthorized 
Practice Committee and a Student Bar membership card 
shall be issued. 
       (2)         A certification of the clinical course by the law school 
dean: 
      (i)     Shall accompany the Dean’s certification of the 
student. 
(ii)  Shall certify that the clinical course and the pre or 
co-requisite instruction are designed to provide the 
student with classroom or individual instruction to 
ensure that the student knows and understands the 
substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law required to 
provide competent representation. 
 
  (d)     Other Activities. 
      (1)        In addition to participating in pending cases and 
matters as provided in section (a)(1) of this Rule, an eligible student may 
engage in other activities of the “clinical program” under the general 
supervision, but outside the physical presence, of the supervising lawyer, 
including those actions defined herein as the “limited practice of law,” 
with the exception of the following: appearing before a tribunal unless the 
tribunal consents with respect to a non-contested matter; conducting 
depositions; engaging in contract closings; and engaging in final 
settlement agreements. 
 (2)       All pleadings, briefs, and other documents prepared for a case 
and delivered to any tribunal, opposing or co-counsel, clients, or other 
persons involved in the matter for which representation is provided 
pursuant to these rules must be signed by the student and the supervisor. 
 (3)      An eligible law student may participate in oral argument in this 
Court in the presence of the supervising lawyer in any appeal, including 
felony and misdemeanor cases, provided that there is filed with the Clerk a 
written consent from the client to that appearance and the supervising 
lawyer indicates in writing approval of that appearance. 
 
(e)           Supervision. 
        The “supervising lawyer” referred to in this Rule shall: 
  (1)    Be a lawyer whose service as a supervising lawyer for 
the clinical program is approved by the dean of the law school 
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in which the law student is enrolled. 
(2)    Assume full responsibility for guiding the student’s work 
in any pending case or                   matter or other activity in 
which the student participates and for supervising the quality 
of that student’s work. 
(3)      Assist the student in preparation of the case or matter, 
to the extent necessary in the supervising lawyer’s 
professional judgment to ensure that the student’s 
participation is effective on behalf of any client represented. 
(4)   Except as provided below for new and visiting faculty 
members, be an “active”          member of the District of 
Columbia Bar as set forth in the rules of this court governing 
the Bar of the District of Columbia.  
        (i)     New Faculty Members.  
         (A)    A supervisor who joins a 
District of Columbia law             school 
clinical faculty may supervise students 
if he or she is an active member in good 
standing of the highest court of any 
state, has not been suspended or 
disbarred for disciplinary reasons from 
practice in any court, and is not subject 
to any pending disciplinary complaints 
for violations of the rules of any court, 
provided that the person has submitted 
an application for admission to the 
District of Columbia Bar within ninety 
(90) days after assuming the position of 
a clinical faculty member in the District 
of Columbia and has submitted an 
application to the Court of Appeals for 
a waiver of this rule.   
(B)  Such faculty member must be 
supervised by an enrolled, active 
member of the Bar who has suitable 
experience and is employed by the law 
school and connected with the school’s 
clinical program.    
(C)    Such new faculty members shall 
be subject to the   rules of the court 
governing the Bar of the District of 
Columbia, including the District of 
Columbia Unauthorized Practice Rule 
(D.C. App. R. 49), and the District of 
Columbia Rules of Professional 
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Conduct which, pursuant to Rule X and 
Appendix A thereof, constitute the 
standards governing the practice of law 
in the District of Columbia. 
(D) A new faculty member must 
cease supervising students if his or her 
application for admission to the Bar is 
denied.  
(ii) Visiting Faculty Members 
(A) A supervisor who is a visiting 
faculty member at a District of 
Columbia law school for one year or 
less may supervise students without 
being a member of the District of 
Columbia Bar if the visiting faculty 
member is an active member in good 
standing of the highest court of any 
state, has not been suspended or 
disbarred for disciplinary reasons from 
practice in any court, is not subject to 
any pending disciplinary complaints for 
violations of the rules of any court, and 
has submitted an application to the 
Court of Appeals for a waiver of this 
rule.   
(B) The visiting faculty member 
shall certify in the application for a 
waiver that he or she has completed the 
Mandatory Course on the District of 
Columbia Rules of Professional 
Conduct and District of Columbia 
Practice required for new admittees to 
the District of Columbia Bar. 
(C) Such visiting faculty member 
must be supervised by an enrolled, 
active member of the Bar who has 
suitable experience and is employed by 
the law school and is connected with 
the school’s clinical program.   
(D) Visiting faculty may extend 
their supervisory duties pursuant to this 
rule for one additional year by filing 
notice with the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals. 
(E) Such visiting faculty 
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members shall be subject to the rules of 
the court governing the Bar of the 
District of Columbia, including the 
District of Columbia Student Practice 
Rule (D.C. App. R. 48), the District of 
Columbia Unauthorized Practice Rule 
(D.C. App. R. 49), and the District of 
Columbia Rules of Professional 
Conduct which, pursuant to Rule X and 
Appendix A thereof, constitute the 
standards governing the practice of law 
in the District of Columbia. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHARACTER 
APPEARING 
IN THE STUDENT BAR APPLICATION  
PRIOR TO 2014 
  
1. Have you ever been dropped, suspended, warned, place 
on scholastic or disciplinary probation, expelled, requested 
to resign, or allowed to resign in lieu of discipline, from 
any school (above the elementary school level), college, or 
university, or otherwise subjected to discipline by any such 
school or institution, or requested or advised by any such 
school or institution to discontinue your studies therein? 
 
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including 
supporting documents or records) 
 
2. Either as an adult or a juvenile, have you ever been cited, 
arrested, charged or convicted for any violation of any law 
(except minor traffic violation)? Alcohol or drug related 
offenses and moving traffic violations are not considered to 
be minor. 
 
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including 
supporting documents or records) 
 
3. During the past five years, have you been addicted to, 
treated for, or counseled concerning the use of any drug, 
including alcohol? 
 
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including 
supporting documents or records) 
 
4. During the past five years, have you voluntarily entered 
or been involuntarily admitted to an institution for 
treatment of a mental, emotional or nervous disorder or 
condition? 
 
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including 
supporting documents or records) 
 
5. Have you ever been delinquent in any financial 
obligations, including student loans and credit cards? 
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IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including 
supporting documents or records) 
 
6. Have you ever been a party in any civil proceeding 
(including landlord/tenant and bankruptcy matters) or 
family law matter (including continuing orders for child 
support)? 
 
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including 
supporting documents or records) 
  
I do hereby state that I have read and understand the 
provisions of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals governing the Bar of the District of Columbia, 
including the Rule of Professional Conduct which 
constitute the standards governing the practice of law in the 
District of Columbia; and that I will fully comply with all 
the provisions thereof. 
 
I further certify that I have read the foregoing document, 
that I have answered all questions fully and frankly, and 
that my answers are complete and true to the best of my 
knowledge. 
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